Participation Incentives in Online Cooperative Games
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866913710267695104 |
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| author | Aziz, Haris Guo, Yuhang Sun, Zhaohong |
| author_facet | Aziz, Haris Guo, Yuhang Sun, Zhaohong |
| contents | This paper studies cooperative games where coalitions are formed online and the value generated by the grand coalition must be irrevocably distributed among the players at each timestep. We investigate the fundamental issue of strategic pariticipation incentives and address these concerns by formalizing natural participation incentive axioms. Our analysis reveals that existing value-sharing mechanisms fail to meet these criteria. Consequently, we propose several new mechanisms that not only fulfill these desirable participation incentive axioms but also satisfy the early arrival incentive for general valuation functions. Additionally, we refine our mechanisms under superadditive valuations to ensure individual rationality while preserving the previously established axioms. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_19791 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Participation Incentives in Online Cooperative Games Aziz, Haris Guo, Yuhang Sun, Zhaohong Computer Science and Game Theory This paper studies cooperative games where coalitions are formed online and the value generated by the grand coalition must be irrevocably distributed among the players at each timestep. We investigate the fundamental issue of strategic pariticipation incentives and address these concerns by formalizing natural participation incentive axioms. Our analysis reveals that existing value-sharing mechanisms fail to meet these criteria. Consequently, we propose several new mechanisms that not only fulfill these desirable participation incentive axioms but also satisfy the early arrival incentive for general valuation functions. Additionally, we refine our mechanisms under superadditive valuations to ensure individual rationality while preserving the previously established axioms. |
| title | Participation Incentives in Online Cooperative Games |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.19791 |