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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.20012 |
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| _version_ | 1866916897272889344 |
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| author | Sommer, Yonatan Hikri, Ivri Amit, Lotan Rosenfeld, Nir |
| author_facet | Sommer, Yonatan Hikri, Ivri Amit, Lotan Rosenfeld, Nir |
| contents | When learning is used to inform decisions about humans, such as for loans, hiring, or admissions, this can incentivize users to strategically modify their features, at a cost, to obtain positive predictions. The common assumption is that the function governing costs is exogenous, fixed, and predetermined. We challenge this assumption, and assert that costs can emerge as a result of deploying a classifier. Our idea is simple: when users seek positive predictions, this creates demand for important features; and if features are available for purchase, then a market will form, and competition will give rise to prices. We extend the strategic classification framework to support this notion, and study learning in a setting where a classifier can induce a market for features. We present an analysis of the learning task, devise an algorithm for computing market prices, propose a differentiable learning framework, and conduct experiments to explore our novel setting and approach. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2502_20012 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Learning Classifiers That Induce Markets Sommer, Yonatan Hikri, Ivri Amit, Lotan Rosenfeld, Nir Machine Learning When learning is used to inform decisions about humans, such as for loans, hiring, or admissions, this can incentivize users to strategically modify their features, at a cost, to obtain positive predictions. The common assumption is that the function governing costs is exogenous, fixed, and predetermined. We challenge this assumption, and assert that costs can emerge as a result of deploying a classifier. Our idea is simple: when users seek positive predictions, this creates demand for important features; and if features are available for purchase, then a market will form, and competition will give rise to prices. We extend the strategic classification framework to support this notion, and study learning in a setting where a classifier can induce a market for features. We present an analysis of the learning task, devise an algorithm for computing market prices, propose a differentiable learning framework, and conduct experiments to explore our novel setting and approach. |
| title | Learning Classifiers That Induce Markets |
| topic | Machine Learning |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.20012 |