Artemis: Toward Accurate Detection of Server-Side Request Forgeries through LLM-Assisted Inter-Procedural Path-Sensitive Taint Analysis

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Ji, Yuchen, Dai, Ting, Zhou, Zhichao, Tang, Yutian, He, Jingzhu
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2025
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author Ji, Yuchen
Dai, Ting
Zhou, Zhichao
Tang, Yutian
He, Jingzhu
author_facet Ji, Yuchen
Dai, Ting
Zhou, Zhichao
Tang, Yutian
He, Jingzhu
contents Server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities are inevitable in PHP web applications. Existing static tools in detecting vulnerabilities in PHP web applications neither contain SSRF-related features to enhance detection accuracy nor consider PHP's dynamic type features. In this paper, we present Artemis, a static taint analysis tool for detecting SSRF vulnerabilities in PHP web applications. First, Artemis extracts both PHP built-in and third-party functions as candidate source and sink functions. Second, Artemis constructs both explicit and implicit call graphs to infer functions' relationships. Third, Artemis performs taint analysis based on a set of rules that prevent over-tainting and pauses when SSRF exploitation is impossible. Fourth, Artemis analyzes the compatibility of path conditions to prune false positives. We have implemented a prototype of Artemis and evaluated it on 250 PHP web applications. Artemis reports 207 true vulnerable paths (106 true SSRFs) with 15 false positives. Of the 106 detected SSRFs, 35 are newly found and reported to developers, with 24 confirmed and assigned CVE IDs.
format Preprint
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institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Artemis: Toward Accurate Detection of Server-Side Request Forgeries through LLM-Assisted Inter-Procedural Path-Sensitive Taint Analysis
Ji, Yuchen
Dai, Ting
Zhou, Zhichao
Tang, Yutian
He, Jingzhu
Cryptography and Security
Programming Languages
Software Engineering
Server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities are inevitable in PHP web applications. Existing static tools in detecting vulnerabilities in PHP web applications neither contain SSRF-related features to enhance detection accuracy nor consider PHP's dynamic type features. In this paper, we present Artemis, a static taint analysis tool for detecting SSRF vulnerabilities in PHP web applications. First, Artemis extracts both PHP built-in and third-party functions as candidate source and sink functions. Second, Artemis constructs both explicit and implicit call graphs to infer functions' relationships. Third, Artemis performs taint analysis based on a set of rules that prevent over-tainting and pauses when SSRF exploitation is impossible. Fourth, Artemis analyzes the compatibility of path conditions to prune false positives. We have implemented a prototype of Artemis and evaluated it on 250 PHP web applications. Artemis reports 207 true vulnerable paths (106 true SSRFs) with 15 false positives. Of the 106 detected SSRFs, 35 are newly found and reported to developers, with 24 confirmed and assigned CVE IDs.
title Artemis: Toward Accurate Detection of Server-Side Request Forgeries through LLM-Assisted Inter-Procedural Path-Sensitive Taint Analysis
topic Cryptography and Security
Programming Languages
Software Engineering
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.21026