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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.00078 |
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| _version_ | 1866916636292808704 |
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| author | Zhang, Yi Kapoor, Sanjiv |
| author_facet | Zhang, Yi Kapoor, Sanjiv |
| contents | In this paper we consider non-atomic games in populations that are provided with a choice of preventive policies to act against a contagion spreading amongst interacting populations, be it biological organisms or connected computing devices. The spreading model of the contagion is the standard SIR model. Each participant of the population has a choice from amongst a set of precautionary policies with each policy presenting a payoff or utility, which we assume is the same within each group, the risk being the possibility of infection. The policy groups interact with each other. We also define a network model to model interactions between different population sets. The population sets reside at nodes of the network and follow policies available at that node. We define game-theoretic models and study the inefficiency of allowing for individual decision making, as opposed to centralized control. We study the computational aspects as well. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2503_00078 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Equilibrium and Selfish Behavior in Network Contagion Zhang, Yi Kapoor, Sanjiv Computer Science and Game Theory Computational Complexity In this paper we consider non-atomic games in populations that are provided with a choice of preventive policies to act against a contagion spreading amongst interacting populations, be it biological organisms or connected computing devices. The spreading model of the contagion is the standard SIR model. Each participant of the population has a choice from amongst a set of precautionary policies with each policy presenting a payoff or utility, which we assume is the same within each group, the risk being the possibility of infection. The policy groups interact with each other. We also define a network model to model interactions between different population sets. The population sets reside at nodes of the network and follow policies available at that node. We define game-theoretic models and study the inefficiency of allowing for individual decision making, as opposed to centralized control. We study the computational aspects as well. |
| title | Equilibrium and Selfish Behavior in Network Contagion |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Computational Complexity |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.00078 |