The Complexity of Extending Fair Allocations of Indivisible Goods

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Deligkas, Argyrios, Eiben, Eduard, Ganian, Robert, Goldsmith, Tiger-Lily, Ioannidis, Stavros D.
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2025
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author Deligkas, Argyrios
Eiben, Eduard
Ganian, Robert
Goldsmith, Tiger-Lily
Ioannidis, Stavros D.
author_facet Deligkas, Argyrios
Eiben, Eduard
Ganian, Robert
Goldsmith, Tiger-Lily
Ioannidis, Stavros D.
contents We initiate the study of computing envy-free allocations of indivisible items in the extension setting, i.e., when some part of the allocation is fixed and the task is to allocate the remaining items. Given the known NP-hardness of the problem, we investigate whether -- and under which conditions -- one can obtain fixed-parameter algorithms for computing a solution in settings where most of the allocation is already fixed. Our results provide a broad complexity-theoretic classification of the problem which includes: (a) fixed-parameter algorithms tailored to settings with few distinct types of agents or items; (b) lower bounds which exclude the generalization of these positive results to more general settings. We conclude by showing that -- unlike when computing allocations from scratch -- the non-algorithmic question of whether more relaxed EFX allocations exist can be completely resolved in the extension setting.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2503_01368
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle The Complexity of Extending Fair Allocations of Indivisible Goods
Deligkas, Argyrios
Eiben, Eduard
Ganian, Robert
Goldsmith, Tiger-Lily
Ioannidis, Stavros D.
Computer Science and Game Theory
Data Structures and Algorithms
91B32
F.2.2
We initiate the study of computing envy-free allocations of indivisible items in the extension setting, i.e., when some part of the allocation is fixed and the task is to allocate the remaining items. Given the known NP-hardness of the problem, we investigate whether -- and under which conditions -- one can obtain fixed-parameter algorithms for computing a solution in settings where most of the allocation is already fixed. Our results provide a broad complexity-theoretic classification of the problem which includes: (a) fixed-parameter algorithms tailored to settings with few distinct types of agents or items; (b) lower bounds which exclude the generalization of these positive results to more general settings. We conclude by showing that -- unlike when computing allocations from scratch -- the non-algorithmic question of whether more relaxed EFX allocations exist can be completely resolved in the extension setting.
title The Complexity of Extending Fair Allocations of Indivisible Goods
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
Data Structures and Algorithms
91B32
F.2.2
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.01368