Formally Discovering and Reproducing Network Protocols Vulnerabilities
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866912256850132992 |
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| author | Crochet, Christophe Aoga, John Legay, Axel |
| author_facet | Crochet, Christophe Aoga, John Legay, Axel |
| contents | The rapid evolution of cyber threats has increased the need for robust methods to discover vulnerabilities in increasingly complex and diverse network protocols. This paper introduces Network Attack-centric Compositional Testing (NACT), a novel methodology designed to discover new vulnerabilities in network protocols and create scenarios to reproduce these vulnerabilities through attacker models. NACT integrates composable attacker specifications, formal specification mutations, and randomized constraint-solving techniques to generate sophisticated attack scenarios and test cases. The methodology enables comprehensive testing of both single-protocol and multi-protocol interactions. Through case studies involving a custom minimalist protocol (MiniP) and five widely used QUIC implementations, NACT is shown to effectively identify, reproduce, and find new real-world vulnerabilities such as version negotiation abuse. Additionally, by comparing the current and older versions of these QUIC implementations, NACT demonstrates its ability to detect both persistent vulnerabilities and regressions. Finally, by supporting cross-protocol testing within a black-box testing framework, NACT provides a versatile approach to improve the security of network protocols. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2503_01538 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Formally Discovering and Reproducing Network Protocols Vulnerabilities Crochet, Christophe Aoga, John Legay, Axel Cryptography and Security Formal Languages and Automata Theory Networking and Internet Architecture The rapid evolution of cyber threats has increased the need for robust methods to discover vulnerabilities in increasingly complex and diverse network protocols. This paper introduces Network Attack-centric Compositional Testing (NACT), a novel methodology designed to discover new vulnerabilities in network protocols and create scenarios to reproduce these vulnerabilities through attacker models. NACT integrates composable attacker specifications, formal specification mutations, and randomized constraint-solving techniques to generate sophisticated attack scenarios and test cases. The methodology enables comprehensive testing of both single-protocol and multi-protocol interactions. Through case studies involving a custom minimalist protocol (MiniP) and five widely used QUIC implementations, NACT is shown to effectively identify, reproduce, and find new real-world vulnerabilities such as version negotiation abuse. Additionally, by comparing the current and older versions of these QUIC implementations, NACT demonstrates its ability to detect both persistent vulnerabilities and regressions. Finally, by supporting cross-protocol testing within a black-box testing framework, NACT provides a versatile approach to improve the security of network protocols. |
| title | Formally Discovering and Reproducing Network Protocols Vulnerabilities |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Formal Languages and Automata Theory Networking and Internet Architecture |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.01538 |