Too Much to Trust? Measuring the Security and Cognitive Impacts of Explainability in AI-Driven SOCs

Fuente: arXiv
Salvato in:
Dettagli Bibliografici
Autori principali: Rastogi, Nidhi, Pant, Shirid, Dhanuka, Devang, Saxena, Amulya, Mairal, Pranjal
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
Soggetti:
Accesso online:
Tags: Aggiungi Tag
Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!
_version_ 1866909695587909632
author Rastogi, Nidhi
Pant, Shirid
Dhanuka, Devang
Saxena, Amulya
Mairal, Pranjal
author_facet Rastogi, Nidhi
Pant, Shirid
Dhanuka, Devang
Saxena, Amulya
Mairal, Pranjal
contents Explainable AI (XAI) holds significant promise for enhancing the transparency and trustworthiness of AI-driven threat detection in Security Operations Centers (SOCs). However, identifying the appropriate level and format of explanation, particularly in environments that demand rapid decision-making under high-stakes conditions, remains a complex and underexplored challenge. To address this gap, we conducted a three-month mixed-methods study combining an online survey (N1=248) with in-depth interviews (N2=24) to examine (1) how SOC analysts conceptualize AI-generated explanations and (2) which types of explanations are perceived as actionable and trustworthy across different analyst roles. Our findings reveal that participants were consistently willing to accept XAI outputs, even in cases of lower predictive accuracy, when explanations were perceived as relevant and evidence-backed. Analysts repeatedly emphasized the importance of understanding the rationale behind AI decisions, expressing a strong preference for contextual depth over a mere presentation of outcomes on dashboards. Building on these insights, this study re-evaluates current explanation methods within security contexts and demonstrates that role-aware, context-rich XAI designs aligned with SOC workflows can substantially improve practical utility. Such tailored explainability enhances analyst comprehension, increases triage efficiency, and supports more confident responses to evolving threats.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2503_02065
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Too Much to Trust? Measuring the Security and Cognitive Impacts of Explainability in AI-Driven SOCs
Rastogi, Nidhi
Pant, Shirid
Dhanuka, Devang
Saxena, Amulya
Mairal, Pranjal
Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
Information Retrieval
I.2; E.3; J.4
Explainable AI (XAI) holds significant promise for enhancing the transparency and trustworthiness of AI-driven threat detection in Security Operations Centers (SOCs). However, identifying the appropriate level and format of explanation, particularly in environments that demand rapid decision-making under high-stakes conditions, remains a complex and underexplored challenge. To address this gap, we conducted a three-month mixed-methods study combining an online survey (N1=248) with in-depth interviews (N2=24) to examine (1) how SOC analysts conceptualize AI-generated explanations and (2) which types of explanations are perceived as actionable and trustworthy across different analyst roles. Our findings reveal that participants were consistently willing to accept XAI outputs, even in cases of lower predictive accuracy, when explanations were perceived as relevant and evidence-backed. Analysts repeatedly emphasized the importance of understanding the rationale behind AI decisions, expressing a strong preference for contextual depth over a mere presentation of outcomes on dashboards. Building on these insights, this study re-evaluates current explanation methods within security contexts and demonstrates that role-aware, context-rich XAI designs aligned with SOC workflows can substantially improve practical utility. Such tailored explainability enhances analyst comprehension, increases triage efficiency, and supports more confident responses to evolving threats.
title Too Much to Trust? Measuring the Security and Cognitive Impacts of Explainability in AI-Driven SOCs
topic Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
Information Retrieval
I.2; E.3; J.4
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.02065