On voting rules satisfying false-name-proofness and participation
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866917494721085440 |
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| author | Bonifacio, Agustin G. Fioravanti, Federico |
| author_facet | Bonifacio, Agustin G. Fioravanti, Federico |
| contents | We consider voting rules in settings where voters' identities are difficult to verify. Voters can manipulate the process by casting multiple votes under different identities or abstaining from voting. Immunities to such manipulations are called \emph{false-name-proofness} and \emph{participation}, respectively. For the universal domain of (strict) preferences, these properties together imply \emph{anonymity} and are incompatible with \emph{neutrality}. For the domain of preferences defined over all subsets of a given set of objects, both \emph{false-name-proofness} and \emph{participation} cannot be met by rules that are also \emph{onto}, \emph{object neutral}, and \emph{tops-only}. However, when preferences over subsets of objects are restricted to be separable, all these properties can be satisfied. Furthermore, the domain of separable preferences is maximal for these properties. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2503_02740 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | On voting rules satisfying false-name-proofness and participation Bonifacio, Agustin G. Fioravanti, Federico Theoretical Economics We consider voting rules in settings where voters' identities are difficult to verify. Voters can manipulate the process by casting multiple votes under different identities or abstaining from voting. Immunities to such manipulations are called \emph{false-name-proofness} and \emph{participation}, respectively. For the universal domain of (strict) preferences, these properties together imply \emph{anonymity} and are incompatible with \emph{neutrality}. For the domain of preferences defined over all subsets of a given set of objects, both \emph{false-name-proofness} and \emph{participation} cannot be met by rules that are also \emph{onto}, \emph{object neutral}, and \emph{tops-only}. However, when preferences over subsets of objects are restricted to be separable, all these properties can be satisfied. Furthermore, the domain of separable preferences is maximal for these properties. |
| title | On voting rules satisfying false-name-proofness and participation |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.02740 |