Optimal Policy Design for Repeated Decision-Making under Social Influence

Fuente: arXiv
Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Ravazzi, Chiara, Breschi, Valentina, Frasca, Paolo, Dabbene, Fabrizio, Tanelli, Mara
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
Subjects:
Online Access:
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1866913720164155392
author Ravazzi, Chiara
Breschi, Valentina
Frasca, Paolo
Dabbene, Fabrizio
Tanelli, Mara
author_facet Ravazzi, Chiara
Breschi, Valentina
Frasca, Paolo
Dabbene, Fabrizio
Tanelli, Mara
contents In this paper, we present a novel model to characterize individual tendencies in repeated decision-making scenarios, with the goal of designing model-based control strategies that promote virtuous choices amidst social and external influences. Our approach builds on the classical Friedkin and Johnsen model of social influence, extending it to include random factors (e.g., inherent variability in individual needs) and controllable external inputs. We explicitly account for the temporal separation between two processes that shape opinion dynamics: individual decision-making and social imitation. While individual decisions occur at regular, frequent intervals, the influence of social imitation unfolds over longer periods. The inclusion of random factors naturally leads to dynamics that do not converge in the classical sense. However, under specific conditions, we prove that opinions exhibit ergodic behavior. Building on this result, we propose a constrained asymptotic optimal control problem designed to foster, on average, social acceptance of a target action within a network. To address the transient dynamics of opinions, we reformulate this problem within a Model Predictive Control (MPC) framework. Simulations highlight the significance of accounting for these transient effects in steering individuals toward virtuous choices while managing policy costs.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2503_03657
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Optimal Policy Design for Repeated Decision-Making under Social Influence
Ravazzi, Chiara
Breschi, Valentina
Frasca, Paolo
Dabbene, Fabrizio
Tanelli, Mara
Systems and Control
Social and Information Networks
In this paper, we present a novel model to characterize individual tendencies in repeated decision-making scenarios, with the goal of designing model-based control strategies that promote virtuous choices amidst social and external influences. Our approach builds on the classical Friedkin and Johnsen model of social influence, extending it to include random factors (e.g., inherent variability in individual needs) and controllable external inputs. We explicitly account for the temporal separation between two processes that shape opinion dynamics: individual decision-making and social imitation. While individual decisions occur at regular, frequent intervals, the influence of social imitation unfolds over longer periods. The inclusion of random factors naturally leads to dynamics that do not converge in the classical sense. However, under specific conditions, we prove that opinions exhibit ergodic behavior. Building on this result, we propose a constrained asymptotic optimal control problem designed to foster, on average, social acceptance of a target action within a network. To address the transient dynamics of opinions, we reformulate this problem within a Model Predictive Control (MPC) framework. Simulations highlight the significance of accounting for these transient effects in steering individuals toward virtuous choices while managing policy costs.
title Optimal Policy Design for Repeated Decision-Making under Social Influence
topic Systems and Control
Social and Information Networks
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.03657