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Autori principali: Ng, Lucien K. L., Moreno-Sanchez, Pedro, Minaei, Mohsen, Chatzigiannis, Panagiotis, Bhat, Adithya, Le, Duc V.
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
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Accesso online:https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.04549
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author Ng, Lucien K. L.
Moreno-Sanchez, Pedro
Minaei, Mohsen
Chatzigiannis, Panagiotis
Bhat, Adithya
Le, Duc V.
author_facet Ng, Lucien K. L.
Moreno-Sanchez, Pedro
Minaei, Mohsen
Chatzigiannis, Panagiotis
Bhat, Adithya
Le, Duc V.
contents Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive Argument of Knowledge (zk-SNARK) schemes have gained significant adoption in privacy-preserving applications, decentralized systems (e.g., blockchain), and verifiable computation due to their efficiency. However, the most efficient zk-SNARKs often rely on a one-time trusted setup to generate a public parameter, often known as the ``Powers of Tau" (PoT) string. The leakage of the secret parameter, $τ$, in the string would allow attackers to generate false proofs, compromising the soundness of all zk-SNARK systems built on it. Prior proposals for decentralized setup ceremonies have utilized blockchain-based smart contracts to allow any party to contribute randomness to $τ$ while also preventing censorship of contributions. For a PoT string of $d$-degree generated by the randomness of $m$ contributors, these solutions required a total of $O(md)$ on-chain operations (i.e., in terms of both storage and cryptographic operations). These operations primarily consisted of costly group operations, particularly scalar multiplication on pairing curves, which discouraged participation and limited the impact of decentralization In this work, we present Lite-PoT, which includes two key protocols designed to reduce participation costs: \emph{(i)} a fraud-proof protocol to reduce the number of expensive on-chain cryptographic group operations to $O(1)$ per contributor. Our experimental results show that (with one transaction per update) our protocol enables decentralized ceremonies for PoT strings up to a $2^{15}$ degree, an $\approx 16x$ improvement over existing on-chain solutions; \emph{(ii)} a proof aggregation technique that batches $m$ randomness contributions into one on-chain update with only $O(d)$ on-chain operations, independent of $m$. This significantly reduces the monetary cost of on-chain updates by $m$-fold via amortization.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2503_04549
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Lite-PoT: Practical Powers-of-Tau Setup Ceremony
Ng, Lucien K. L.
Moreno-Sanchez, Pedro
Minaei, Mohsen
Chatzigiannis, Panagiotis
Bhat, Adithya
Le, Duc V.
Cryptography and Security
Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive Argument of Knowledge (zk-SNARK) schemes have gained significant adoption in privacy-preserving applications, decentralized systems (e.g., blockchain), and verifiable computation due to their efficiency. However, the most efficient zk-SNARKs often rely on a one-time trusted setup to generate a public parameter, often known as the ``Powers of Tau" (PoT) string. The leakage of the secret parameter, $τ$, in the string would allow attackers to generate false proofs, compromising the soundness of all zk-SNARK systems built on it. Prior proposals for decentralized setup ceremonies have utilized blockchain-based smart contracts to allow any party to contribute randomness to $τ$ while also preventing censorship of contributions. For a PoT string of $d$-degree generated by the randomness of $m$ contributors, these solutions required a total of $O(md)$ on-chain operations (i.e., in terms of both storage and cryptographic operations). These operations primarily consisted of costly group operations, particularly scalar multiplication on pairing curves, which discouraged participation and limited the impact of decentralization In this work, we present Lite-PoT, which includes two key protocols designed to reduce participation costs: \emph{(i)} a fraud-proof protocol to reduce the number of expensive on-chain cryptographic group operations to $O(1)$ per contributor. Our experimental results show that (with one transaction per update) our protocol enables decentralized ceremonies for PoT strings up to a $2^{15}$ degree, an $\approx 16x$ improvement over existing on-chain solutions; \emph{(ii)} a proof aggregation technique that batches $m$ randomness contributions into one on-chain update with only $O(d)$ on-chain operations, independent of $m$. This significantly reduces the monetary cost of on-chain updates by $m$-fold via amortization.
title Lite-PoT: Practical Powers-of-Tau Setup Ceremony
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.04549