Physical, Empirical, and Conditional Inductive Possibility
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autore principale: | |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| Accesso online: | |
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| _version_ | 1866912262813384704 |
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| author | Gyenis, Balazs |
| author_facet | Gyenis, Balazs |
| contents | I argue that John Norton's notions of empirical, hypothetical, and counterfactual possibility can be successfully used to analyze counterintuitive examples of physical possibility and align better with modal intuitions of practicing physicists. First, I clarify the relationship between Norton's possibility notions and the received view of logical and physical possibility. In particular, I argue that Norton's empirical, hypothetical, and counterfactual possibility cannot coincide with the received view of physical possibility; instead, the received view of physical possibility is a special case of Norton's logical possibility. I illustrate my claims using examples from Classical Mechanics, General Relativity, and Quantum Mechanics. I then arrive at my conclusions by subsuming Norton's empirical, hypothetical, and counterfactual possibilities under a single concept of conditional inductive possibility and by analyzing the types and degrees of strengths that can be associated with it. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2503_04601 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Physical, Empirical, and Conditional Inductive Possibility Gyenis, Balazs History and Philosophy of Physics I argue that John Norton's notions of empirical, hypothetical, and counterfactual possibility can be successfully used to analyze counterintuitive examples of physical possibility and align better with modal intuitions of practicing physicists. First, I clarify the relationship between Norton's possibility notions and the received view of logical and physical possibility. In particular, I argue that Norton's empirical, hypothetical, and counterfactual possibility cannot coincide with the received view of physical possibility; instead, the received view of physical possibility is a special case of Norton's logical possibility. I illustrate my claims using examples from Classical Mechanics, General Relativity, and Quantum Mechanics. I then arrive at my conclusions by subsuming Norton's empirical, hypothetical, and counterfactual possibilities under a single concept of conditional inductive possibility and by analyzing the types and degrees of strengths that can be associated with it. |
| title | Physical, Empirical, and Conditional Inductive Possibility |
| topic | History and Philosophy of Physics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.04601 |