Enregistré dans:
| Auteurs principaux: | , , , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
|
| Sujets: | |
| Accès en ligne: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.06532 |
| Tags: |
Ajouter un tag
Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!
|
| _version_ | 1866916647240990720 |
|---|---|
| author | Li, Chuang Huang, Lanfang He, Dian Wen, Yanhua Liu, Gang Duan, Lixin |
| author_facet | Li, Chuang Huang, Lanfang He, Dian Wen, Yanhua Liu, Gang Duan, Lixin |
| contents | The serverless platform aims to facilitate cloud applications' straightforward deployment, scaling, and management. Unfortunately, the distributed nature of serverless computing makes it difficult to port traditional security tools directly. The existing serverless solutions primarily identify potential threats or performance bottlenecks through post-analysis of modified operating system audit logs, detection of encrypted traffic offloading, or the collection of runtime metrics. However, these methods often prove inadequate for comprehensively detecting communication violations across functions. This limitation restricts the real-time log monitoring and validation capabilities in distributed environments while impeding the maintenance of minimal communication overhead. Therefore, this paper presents FaaSMT, which aims to fill this gap by addressing research questions related to security checks and the optimization of performance and costs in serverless applications. This framework employs parallel processing for the collection of distributed data logs, incorporating Merkle Tree algorithms and heuristic optimisation methods to achieve adaptive inline security task execution. The results of experimental trials demonstrate that FaaSMT is capable of effectively identifying major attack types (e.g., Denial of Wallet (DoW) and Business Logic attacks), thereby providing comprehensive monitoring and validation of function executions while significantly reducing performance overhead. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2503_06532 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | FaaSMT: Lightweight Serverless Framework for Intrusion Detection Using Merkle Tree and Task Inlining Li, Chuang Huang, Lanfang He, Dian Wen, Yanhua Liu, Gang Duan, Lixin Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing The serverless platform aims to facilitate cloud applications' straightforward deployment, scaling, and management. Unfortunately, the distributed nature of serverless computing makes it difficult to port traditional security tools directly. The existing serverless solutions primarily identify potential threats or performance bottlenecks through post-analysis of modified operating system audit logs, detection of encrypted traffic offloading, or the collection of runtime metrics. However, these methods often prove inadequate for comprehensively detecting communication violations across functions. This limitation restricts the real-time log monitoring and validation capabilities in distributed environments while impeding the maintenance of minimal communication overhead. Therefore, this paper presents FaaSMT, which aims to fill this gap by addressing research questions related to security checks and the optimization of performance and costs in serverless applications. This framework employs parallel processing for the collection of distributed data logs, incorporating Merkle Tree algorithms and heuristic optimisation methods to achieve adaptive inline security task execution. The results of experimental trials demonstrate that FaaSMT is capable of effectively identifying major attack types (e.g., Denial of Wallet (DoW) and Business Logic attacks), thereby providing comprehensive monitoring and validation of function executions while significantly reducing performance overhead. |
| title | FaaSMT: Lightweight Serverless Framework for Intrusion Detection Using Merkle Tree and Task Inlining |
| topic | Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.06532 |