Poisoning Attacks to Local Differential Privacy Protocols for Trajectory Data

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Hsu, I-Jung, Lin, Chih-Hsun, Yu, Chia-Mu, Kuo, Sy-Yen, Huang, Chun-Ying
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
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author Hsu, I-Jung
Lin, Chih-Hsun
Yu, Chia-Mu
Kuo, Sy-Yen
Huang, Chun-Ying
author_facet Hsu, I-Jung
Lin, Chih-Hsun
Yu, Chia-Mu
Kuo, Sy-Yen
Huang, Chun-Ying
contents Trajectory data, which tracks movements through geographic locations, is crucial for improving real-world applications. However, collecting such sensitive data raises considerable privacy concerns. Local differential privacy (LDP) offers a solution by allowing individuals to locally perturb their trajectory data before sharing it. Despite its privacy benefits, LDP protocols are vulnerable to data poisoning attacks, where attackers inject fake data to manipulate aggregated results. In this work, we make the first attempt to analyze vulnerabilities in several representative LDP trajectory protocols. We propose \textsc{TraP}, a heuristic algorithm for data \underline{P}oisoning attacks using a prefix-suffix method to optimize fake \underline{Tra}jectory selection, significantly reducing computational complexity. Our experimental results demonstrate that our attack can substantially increase target pattern occurrences in the perturbed trajectory dataset with few fake users. This study underscores the urgent need for robust defenses and better protocol designs to safeguard LDP trajectory data against malicious manipulation.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2503_07483
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Poisoning Attacks to Local Differential Privacy Protocols for Trajectory Data
Hsu, I-Jung
Lin, Chih-Hsun
Yu, Chia-Mu
Kuo, Sy-Yen
Huang, Chun-Ying
Cryptography and Security
Machine Learning
Trajectory data, which tracks movements through geographic locations, is crucial for improving real-world applications. However, collecting such sensitive data raises considerable privacy concerns. Local differential privacy (LDP) offers a solution by allowing individuals to locally perturb their trajectory data before sharing it. Despite its privacy benefits, LDP protocols are vulnerable to data poisoning attacks, where attackers inject fake data to manipulate aggregated results. In this work, we make the first attempt to analyze vulnerabilities in several representative LDP trajectory protocols. We propose \textsc{TraP}, a heuristic algorithm for data \underline{P}oisoning attacks using a prefix-suffix method to optimize fake \underline{Tra}jectory selection, significantly reducing computational complexity. Our experimental results demonstrate that our attack can substantially increase target pattern occurrences in the perturbed trajectory dataset with few fake users. This study underscores the urgent need for robust defenses and better protocol designs to safeguard LDP trajectory data against malicious manipulation.
title Poisoning Attacks to Local Differential Privacy Protocols for Trajectory Data
topic Cryptography and Security
Machine Learning
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.07483