PoisonedParrot: Subtle Data Poisoning Attacks to Elicit Copyright-Infringing Content from Large Language Models

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Panaitescu-Liess, Michael-Andrei, Pathmanathan, Pankayaraj, Kaya, Yigitcan, Che, Zora, An, Bang, Zhu, Sicheng, Agrawal, Aakriti, Huang, Furong
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2025
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author Panaitescu-Liess, Michael-Andrei
Pathmanathan, Pankayaraj
Kaya, Yigitcan
Che, Zora
An, Bang
Zhu, Sicheng
Agrawal, Aakriti
Huang, Furong
author_facet Panaitescu-Liess, Michael-Andrei
Pathmanathan, Pankayaraj
Kaya, Yigitcan
Che, Zora
An, Bang
Zhu, Sicheng
Agrawal, Aakriti
Huang, Furong
contents As the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) continue to expand, their usage has become increasingly prevalent. However, as reflected in numerous ongoing lawsuits regarding LLM-generated content, addressing copyright infringement remains a significant challenge. In this paper, we introduce PoisonedParrot: the first stealthy data poisoning attack that induces an LLM to generate copyrighted content even when the model has not been directly trained on the specific copyrighted material. PoisonedParrot integrates small fragments of copyrighted text into the poison samples using an off-the-shelf LLM. Despite its simplicity, evaluated in a wide range of experiments, PoisonedParrot is surprisingly effective at priming the model to generate copyrighted content with no discernible side effects. Moreover, we discover that existing defenses are largely ineffective against our attack. Finally, we make the first attempt at mitigating copyright-infringement poisoning attacks by proposing a defense: ParrotTrap. We encourage the community to explore this emerging threat model further.
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id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2503_07697
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle PoisonedParrot: Subtle Data Poisoning Attacks to Elicit Copyright-Infringing Content from Large Language Models
Panaitescu-Liess, Michael-Andrei
Pathmanathan, Pankayaraj
Kaya, Yigitcan
Che, Zora
An, Bang
Zhu, Sicheng
Agrawal, Aakriti
Huang, Furong
Machine Learning
Cryptography and Security
As the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) continue to expand, their usage has become increasingly prevalent. However, as reflected in numerous ongoing lawsuits regarding LLM-generated content, addressing copyright infringement remains a significant challenge. In this paper, we introduce PoisonedParrot: the first stealthy data poisoning attack that induces an LLM to generate copyrighted content even when the model has not been directly trained on the specific copyrighted material. PoisonedParrot integrates small fragments of copyrighted text into the poison samples using an off-the-shelf LLM. Despite its simplicity, evaluated in a wide range of experiments, PoisonedParrot is surprisingly effective at priming the model to generate copyrighted content with no discernible side effects. Moreover, we discover that existing defenses are largely ineffective against our attack. Finally, we make the first attempt at mitigating copyright-infringement poisoning attacks by proposing a defense: ParrotTrap. We encourage the community to explore this emerging threat model further.
title PoisonedParrot: Subtle Data Poisoning Attacks to Elicit Copyright-Infringing Content from Large Language Models
topic Machine Learning
Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.07697