Optimal Contract Design with Quadratic Effort Cost

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Chen, Xinfu, Qian, Shuaijie, Qiao, Guan
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2025
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author Chen, Xinfu
Qian, Shuaijie
Qiao, Guan
author_facet Chen, Xinfu
Qian, Shuaijie
Qiao, Guan
contents The existence of an optimal contract of the principal-agent problem is a central issue in contract design. According to Cvitanić et al. [2], such an optimal contract can be derived from the existence of a classical solution to the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, which is a degenerate, fully nonlinear parabolic equation. In this work, we follow their model, consider the case with drift control, and prove the existence of the classical solution to the HJB equation.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2503_08503
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Optimal Contract Design with Quadratic Effort Cost
Chen, Xinfu
Qian, Shuaijie
Qiao, Guan
Mathematical Finance
The existence of an optimal contract of the principal-agent problem is a central issue in contract design. According to Cvitanić et al. [2], such an optimal contract can be derived from the existence of a classical solution to the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, which is a degenerate, fully nonlinear parabolic equation. In this work, we follow their model, consider the case with drift control, and prove the existence of the classical solution to the HJB equation.
title Optimal Contract Design with Quadratic Effort Cost
topic Mathematical Finance
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.08503