Steering No-Regret Agents in MFGs under Model Uncertainty
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arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866913794194669568 |
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| author | Widmer, Leo Huang, Jiawei He, Niao |
| author_facet | Widmer, Leo Huang, Jiawei He, Niao |
| contents | Incentive design is a popular framework for guiding agents' learning dynamics towards desired outcomes by providing additional payments beyond intrinsic rewards. However, most existing works focus on a finite, small set of agents or assume complete knowledge of the game, limiting their applicability to real-world scenarios involving large populations and model uncertainty. To address this gap, we study the design of steering rewards in Mean-Field Games (MFGs) with density-independent transitions, where both the transition dynamics and intrinsic reward functions are unknown. This setting presents non-trivial challenges, as the mediator must incentivize the agents to explore for its model learning under uncertainty, while simultaneously steer them to converge to desired behaviors without incurring excessive incentive payments. Assuming agents exhibit no(-adaptive) regret behaviors, we contribute novel optimistic exploration algorithms. Theoretically, we establish sub-linear regret guarantees for the cumulative gaps between the agents' behaviors and the desired ones. In terms of the steering cost, we demonstrate that our total incentive payments incur only sub-linear excess, competing with a baseline steering strategy that stabilizes the target policy as an equilibrium. Our work presents an effective framework for steering agents behaviors in large-population systems under uncertainty. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2503_09309 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Steering No-Regret Agents in MFGs under Model Uncertainty Widmer, Leo Huang, Jiawei He, Niao Machine Learning Artificial Intelligence Multiagent Systems Incentive design is a popular framework for guiding agents' learning dynamics towards desired outcomes by providing additional payments beyond intrinsic rewards. However, most existing works focus on a finite, small set of agents or assume complete knowledge of the game, limiting their applicability to real-world scenarios involving large populations and model uncertainty. To address this gap, we study the design of steering rewards in Mean-Field Games (MFGs) with density-independent transitions, where both the transition dynamics and intrinsic reward functions are unknown. This setting presents non-trivial challenges, as the mediator must incentivize the agents to explore for its model learning under uncertainty, while simultaneously steer them to converge to desired behaviors without incurring excessive incentive payments. Assuming agents exhibit no(-adaptive) regret behaviors, we contribute novel optimistic exploration algorithms. Theoretically, we establish sub-linear regret guarantees for the cumulative gaps between the agents' behaviors and the desired ones. In terms of the steering cost, we demonstrate that our total incentive payments incur only sub-linear excess, competing with a baseline steering strategy that stabilizes the target policy as an equilibrium. Our work presents an effective framework for steering agents behaviors in large-population systems under uncertainty. |
| title | Steering No-Regret Agents in MFGs under Model Uncertainty |
| topic | Machine Learning Artificial Intelligence Multiagent Systems |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.09309 |