Why the Brain Cannot Be a Digital Computer: History-Dependence and the Computational Limits of Consciousness
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866917956230840320 |
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| author | Knight, Andrew |
| author_facet | Knight, Andrew |
| contents | This paper presents a novel information-theoretic proof demonstrating that the human brain as currently understood cannot function as a classical digital computer. Through systematic quantification of distinguishable conscious states and their historical dependencies, we establish that the minimum information required to specify a conscious state exceeds the physical information capacity of the human brain by a significant factor. Our analysis calculates the bit-length requirements for representing consciously distinguishable sensory "stimulus frames" and demonstrates that consciousness exhibits mandatory temporal-historical dependencies that multiply these requirements beyond the brain's storage capabilities. This mathematical approach offers new insights into the fundamental limitations of computational models of consciousness and suggests that non-classical information processing mechanisms may be necessary to account for conscious experience. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2503_10518 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Why the Brain Cannot Be a Digital Computer: History-Dependence and the Computational Limits of Consciousness Knight, Andrew History and Philosophy of Physics Artificial Intelligence Neurons and Cognition This paper presents a novel information-theoretic proof demonstrating that the human brain as currently understood cannot function as a classical digital computer. Through systematic quantification of distinguishable conscious states and their historical dependencies, we establish that the minimum information required to specify a conscious state exceeds the physical information capacity of the human brain by a significant factor. Our analysis calculates the bit-length requirements for representing consciously distinguishable sensory "stimulus frames" and demonstrates that consciousness exhibits mandatory temporal-historical dependencies that multiply these requirements beyond the brain's storage capabilities. This mathematical approach offers new insights into the fundamental limitations of computational models of consciousness and suggests that non-classical information processing mechanisms may be necessary to account for conscious experience. |
| title | Why the Brain Cannot Be a Digital Computer: History-Dependence and the Computational Limits of Consciousness |
| topic | History and Philosophy of Physics Artificial Intelligence Neurons and Cognition |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.10518 |