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Main Authors: Arribillaga, R. Pablo, Pepa-Risma, Eliana
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.11821
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author Arribillaga, R. Pablo
Pepa-Risma, Eliana
author_facet Arribillaga, R. Pablo
Pepa-Risma, Eliana
contents In two-sided matching markets with contracts, quantile (or generalized median) stable mechanisms represent an interesting class that produces stable allocations which can be viewed as compromises between both sides of the market. These mechanisms balance the competing priorities of the parties while maintaining stability. This paper explores obvious manipulations of quantile stable mechanisms. Unfortunately, we get that any quantile stable mechanism different to the doctor-proposal DA is obviously manipulable. Our findings highlight the trade-offs between robustness to manipulation and other desirable properties, such as equity, in the design of stable matching mechanisms.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2503_11821
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle A Note on Obvious Manipulations of Quantile Stable Mechanisms
Arribillaga, R. Pablo
Pepa-Risma, Eliana
Theoretical Economics
In two-sided matching markets with contracts, quantile (or generalized median) stable mechanisms represent an interesting class that produces stable allocations which can be viewed as compromises between both sides of the market. These mechanisms balance the competing priorities of the parties while maintaining stability. This paper explores obvious manipulations of quantile stable mechanisms. Unfortunately, we get that any quantile stable mechanism different to the doctor-proposal DA is obviously manipulable. Our findings highlight the trade-offs between robustness to manipulation and other desirable properties, such as equity, in the design of stable matching mechanisms.
title A Note on Obvious Manipulations of Quantile Stable Mechanisms
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.11821