Actively learning equilibria in Nash games with misleading information
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866915276062195712 |
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| author | Franci, Barbara Fabiani, Filippo Bemporad, Alberto |
| author_facet | Franci, Barbara Fabiani, Filippo Bemporad, Alberto |
| contents | We develop a scheme based on active learning to compute equilibria in a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). Specifically, an external observer (or entity), with little knowledge on the multi-agent process at hand, collects sensible data by probing the agents' best-response (BR) mappings, which are then used to recursively update local parametric estimates of these mappings. Unlike [1], we consider the realistic case in which the agents share corrupted information with the external entity for, e.g., protecting their privacy. Inspired by a popular approach in stochastic optimization, we endow the external observer with an inexact proximal scheme for updating the local BR proxies. This technique will prove key to establishing the convergence of our scheme under standard assumptions, thereby enabling the external observer to predict an equilibrium strategy even when relying on masked information. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2503_13167 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Actively learning equilibria in Nash games with misleading information Franci, Barbara Fabiani, Filippo Bemporad, Alberto Optimization and Control We develop a scheme based on active learning to compute equilibria in a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). Specifically, an external observer (or entity), with little knowledge on the multi-agent process at hand, collects sensible data by probing the agents' best-response (BR) mappings, which are then used to recursively update local parametric estimates of these mappings. Unlike [1], we consider the realistic case in which the agents share corrupted information with the external entity for, e.g., protecting their privacy. Inspired by a popular approach in stochastic optimization, we endow the external observer with an inexact proximal scheme for updating the local BR proxies. This technique will prove key to establishing the convergence of our scheme under standard assumptions, thereby enabling the external observer to predict an equilibrium strategy even when relying on masked information. |
| title | Actively learning equilibria in Nash games with misleading information |
| topic | Optimization and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.13167 |