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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| Sujets: | |
| Accès en ligne: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.14314 |
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| _version_ | 1866917960039268352 |
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| author | Acerenza, Santiago Martinez-Iriarte, Julian Sánchez-Becerra, Alejandro Spini, Pietro Emilio |
| author_facet | Acerenza, Santiago Martinez-Iriarte, Julian Sánchez-Becerra, Alejandro Spini, Pietro Emilio |
| contents | We obtain partial identification of direct and spillover effects in settings with strategic interaction and discrete treatments, outcome and independent instruments. We consider a framework with two decision-makers who play pure-strategy Nash equilibria in treatment take-up, whose outcomes are determined by their joint take-up decisions. We obtain a latent-type representation at the pair level. We enumerate all types that are consistent with pure-strategy Nash equilibria and exclusion restrictions, and then impose conditions such as symmetry, strategic complementarity/substitution, several notions of monotonicity, and homogeneity. Under any combination of the above restrictions, we provide sharp bounds for our parameters of interest via a simple Python optimization routine. Our framework allows the empirical researcher to tailor the above menu of assumptions to their empirical application and to assess their individual and joint identifying power. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2503_14314 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Bounds for within-household encouragement designs with interference Acerenza, Santiago Martinez-Iriarte, Julian Sánchez-Becerra, Alejandro Spini, Pietro Emilio Econometrics We obtain partial identification of direct and spillover effects in settings with strategic interaction and discrete treatments, outcome and independent instruments. We consider a framework with two decision-makers who play pure-strategy Nash equilibria in treatment take-up, whose outcomes are determined by their joint take-up decisions. We obtain a latent-type representation at the pair level. We enumerate all types that are consistent with pure-strategy Nash equilibria and exclusion restrictions, and then impose conditions such as symmetry, strategic complementarity/substitution, several notions of monotonicity, and homogeneity. Under any combination of the above restrictions, we provide sharp bounds for our parameters of interest via a simple Python optimization routine. Our framework allows the empirical researcher to tailor the above menu of assumptions to their empirical application and to assess their individual and joint identifying power. |
| title | Bounds for within-household encouragement designs with interference |
| topic | Econometrics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.14314 |