Strengthening the No-Go Theorem for QRNGs

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Mongia, Vardaan, Kumar, Abhishek, Prabhakar, Shashi, Singh, R. P.
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Mongia, Vardaan
Kumar, Abhishek
Prabhakar, Shashi
Singh, R. P.
author_facet Mongia, Vardaan
Kumar, Abhishek
Prabhakar, Shashi
Singh, R. P.
contents Quantum random numbers are essential for security against quantum algorithms. Randomness as a beacon is a service being provided for companies and governments to upgrade their security standards from RSA to PQC-QKD or PQC-RSA protocols. Both security mechanisms assume trust in the service provider unless one aims for device-independent protocols. How does an entity ensure that the beacon service has a quantum signature other than relying on faith? Specifically, given a bit-stream, can a user verify a quantum signature in it? Researchers claim this is indecipherable and have stated a no-go theorem for post-processed bit-streams [Physical Review A \textbf{109}, 022243 (2024)]. In this article, we corroborate the results of the no-go theorem while discussing its nuances using two different random number generators and four test methods. These include the NIST statistical test suite and machine learning algorithms that strengthen the theorem. This work is relevant for companies and governments using QRNG, provided to enhance security against quantum threats.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2503_18026
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Strengthening the No-Go Theorem for QRNGs
Mongia, Vardaan
Kumar, Abhishek
Prabhakar, Shashi
Singh, R. P.
Quantum Physics
Optics
Quantum random numbers are essential for security against quantum algorithms. Randomness as a beacon is a service being provided for companies and governments to upgrade their security standards from RSA to PQC-QKD or PQC-RSA protocols. Both security mechanisms assume trust in the service provider unless one aims for device-independent protocols. How does an entity ensure that the beacon service has a quantum signature other than relying on faith? Specifically, given a bit-stream, can a user verify a quantum signature in it? Researchers claim this is indecipherable and have stated a no-go theorem for post-processed bit-streams [Physical Review A \textbf{109}, 022243 (2024)]. In this article, we corroborate the results of the no-go theorem while discussing its nuances using two different random number generators and four test methods. These include the NIST statistical test suite and machine learning algorithms that strengthen the theorem. This work is relevant for companies and governments using QRNG, provided to enhance security against quantum threats.
title Strengthening the No-Go Theorem for QRNGs
topic Quantum Physics
Optics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.18026