Shapley-Scarf Markets with Objective Indifferences
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arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866915763857653760 |
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| author | Sandholtz, Will Tai, Andrew |
| author_facet | Sandholtz, Will Tai, Andrew |
| contents | Top trading cycles with fixed tie-breaking (TTC) has been suggested to deal with indifferences in object allocation problems. Unfortunately, under general indifferences, TTC is neither Pareto efficient nor group strategy-proof. Furthermore, it may not select an allocation in the core of the market, even when the core is non-empty. However, when indifferences are agreed upon by all agents (``objective indifferences''), TTC maintains Pareto efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and core selection. Further, we characterize objective indifferences as the most general setting where TTC maintains these properties. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2503_18144 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Shapley-Scarf Markets with Objective Indifferences Sandholtz, Will Tai, Andrew Theoretical Economics Top trading cycles with fixed tie-breaking (TTC) has been suggested to deal with indifferences in object allocation problems. Unfortunately, under general indifferences, TTC is neither Pareto efficient nor group strategy-proof. Furthermore, it may not select an allocation in the core of the market, even when the core is non-empty. However, when indifferences are agreed upon by all agents (``objective indifferences''), TTC maintains Pareto efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and core selection. Further, we characterize objective indifferences as the most general setting where TTC maintains these properties. |
| title | Shapley-Scarf Markets with Objective Indifferences |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.18144 |