A Stable and Strategy-Proof Controlled School Choice Mechanism with Integrated and Flexible Rules
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866910890066968576 |
|---|---|
| author | Kitahara, Minoru Okumura, Yasunori |
| author_facet | Kitahara, Minoru Okumura, Yasunori |
| contents | We examine a controlled school choice model where students are categorized into different types, and the distribution of these types within a school influences its priority structure. This study provides a general framework that integrates existing controlled school choice models, including those utilizing reserve rules, quota rules, and bonus-point rules. Specifically, we introduce an adjusted scoring rule that unifies these rules. By achieving a matching that satisfies the stability defined in this framework, matching authorities can effectively manage the trade-offs inherent in controlled school choice markets. Moreover, the priority order for a school is represented as a weak order with each given assignment, meaning that ties are allowed. Our mechanism ensures a stable matching and satisfies strategy-proofness. In particular, when priority orders are restricted to linear orders with each given assignment, our mechanism guarantees student-optimal stability. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2503_18220 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Stable and Strategy-Proof Controlled School Choice Mechanism with Integrated and Flexible Rules Kitahara, Minoru Okumura, Yasunori Theoretical Economics We examine a controlled school choice model where students are categorized into different types, and the distribution of these types within a school influences its priority structure. This study provides a general framework that integrates existing controlled school choice models, including those utilizing reserve rules, quota rules, and bonus-point rules. Specifically, we introduce an adjusted scoring rule that unifies these rules. By achieving a matching that satisfies the stability defined in this framework, matching authorities can effectively manage the trade-offs inherent in controlled school choice markets. Moreover, the priority order for a school is represented as a weak order with each given assignment, meaning that ties are allowed. Our mechanism ensures a stable matching and satisfies strategy-proofness. In particular, when priority orders are restricted to linear orders with each given assignment, our mechanism guarantees student-optimal stability. |
| title | A Stable and Strategy-Proof Controlled School Choice Mechanism with Integrated and Flexible Rules |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.18220 |