Activation Functions Considered Harmful: Recovering Neural Network Weights through Controlled Channels
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866908573747904512 |
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| author | Spielman, Jesse Oswald, David Ryan, Mark Van Bulck, Jo |
| author_facet | Spielman, Jesse Oswald, David Ryan, Mark Van Bulck, Jo |
| contents | With high-stakes machine learning applications increasingly moving to untrusted end-user or cloud environments, safeguarding pre-trained model parameters becomes essential for protecting intellectual property and user privacy. Recent advancements in hardware-isolated enclaves, notably Intel SGX, hold the promise to secure the internal state of machine learning applications even against compromised operating systems. However, we show that privileged software adversaries can exploit input-dependent memory access patterns in common neural network activation functions to extract secret weights and biases from an SGX enclave.
Our attack leverages the SGX-Step framework to obtain a noise-free, instruction-granular page-access trace. In a case study of an 11-input regression network using the Tensorflow Microlite library, we demonstrate complete recovery of all first-layer weights and biases, as well as partial recovery of parameters from deeper layers under specific conditions. Our novel attack technique requires only 20 queries per input per weight to obtain all first-layer weights and biases with an average absolute error of less than 1%, improving over prior model stealing attacks.
Additionally, a broader ecosystem analysis reveals the widespread use of activation functions with input-dependent memory access patterns in popular machine learning frameworks (either directly or via underlying math libraries). Our findings highlight the limitations of deploying confidential models in SGX enclaves and emphasise the need for stricter side-channel validation of machine learning implementations, akin to the vetting efforts applied to secure cryptographic libraries. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2503_19142 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Activation Functions Considered Harmful: Recovering Neural Network Weights through Controlled Channels Spielman, Jesse Oswald, David Ryan, Mark Van Bulck, Jo Cryptography and Security Machine Learning With high-stakes machine learning applications increasingly moving to untrusted end-user or cloud environments, safeguarding pre-trained model parameters becomes essential for protecting intellectual property and user privacy. Recent advancements in hardware-isolated enclaves, notably Intel SGX, hold the promise to secure the internal state of machine learning applications even against compromised operating systems. However, we show that privileged software adversaries can exploit input-dependent memory access patterns in common neural network activation functions to extract secret weights and biases from an SGX enclave. Our attack leverages the SGX-Step framework to obtain a noise-free, instruction-granular page-access trace. In a case study of an 11-input regression network using the Tensorflow Microlite library, we demonstrate complete recovery of all first-layer weights and biases, as well as partial recovery of parameters from deeper layers under specific conditions. Our novel attack technique requires only 20 queries per input per weight to obtain all first-layer weights and biases with an average absolute error of less than 1%, improving over prior model stealing attacks. Additionally, a broader ecosystem analysis reveals the widespread use of activation functions with input-dependent memory access patterns in popular machine learning frameworks (either directly or via underlying math libraries). Our findings highlight the limitations of deploying confidential models in SGX enclaves and emphasise the need for stricter side-channel validation of machine learning implementations, akin to the vetting efforts applied to secure cryptographic libraries. |
| title | Activation Functions Considered Harmful: Recovering Neural Network Weights through Controlled Channels |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Machine Learning |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.19142 |