Fair and efficient allocation of indivisible items under category constraints
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arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866913043374407680 |
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| author | Igarashi, Ayumi Meunier, Frédéric |
| author_facet | Igarashi, Ayumi Meunier, Frédéric |
| contents | We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods and chores under category constraints. Specifically, there are $n$ agents and $m$ indivisible items which are partitioned into categories with associated capacities. An allocation is considered feasible if each bundle satisfies the capacity constraints of its respective categories. For the case of two agents, Shoshan et al. (2023) recently developed a polynomial-time algorithm to find a Pareto-optimal allocation satisfying a relaxed version of envy-freeness, called EF$[1,1]$. Extending such guarantees beyond two agents has remained open.
We make progress toward this question by proving that for any number $n$ of agents, there always exists a Pareto-optimal allocation in which each agent can be made envy-free by reallocating at most $\min \{k+1,n\}(n-1)$ items. Moreover, when the number of agents is constant, we give a polynomial-time algorithm to compute such an allocation. Our results rely on a new application of the Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz (KKM) lemma to a simplex of agent weights, which may be of independent interest for fair division problems involving indivisible items. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2503_20260 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Fair and efficient allocation of indivisible items under category constraints Igarashi, Ayumi Meunier, Frédéric Computer Science and Game Theory We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods and chores under category constraints. Specifically, there are $n$ agents and $m$ indivisible items which are partitioned into categories with associated capacities. An allocation is considered feasible if each bundle satisfies the capacity constraints of its respective categories. For the case of two agents, Shoshan et al. (2023) recently developed a polynomial-time algorithm to find a Pareto-optimal allocation satisfying a relaxed version of envy-freeness, called EF$[1,1]$. Extending such guarantees beyond two agents has remained open. We make progress toward this question by proving that for any number $n$ of agents, there always exists a Pareto-optimal allocation in which each agent can be made envy-free by reallocating at most $\min \{k+1,n\}(n-1)$ items. Moreover, when the number of agents is constant, we give a polynomial-time algorithm to compute such an allocation. Our results rely on a new application of the Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz (KKM) lemma to a simplex of agent weights, which may be of independent interest for fair division problems involving indivisible items. |
| title | Fair and efficient allocation of indivisible items under category constraints |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.20260 |