Buffer is All You Need: Defending Federated Learning against Backdoor Attacks under Non-iids via Buffering

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Lyu, Xingyu, Wang, Ning, Xiao, Yang, Li, Shixiong, Li, Tao, Chen, Danjue, Chen, Yimin
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
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author Lyu, Xingyu
Wang, Ning
Xiao, Yang
Li, Shixiong
Li, Tao
Chen, Danjue
Chen, Yimin
author_facet Lyu, Xingyu
Wang, Ning
Xiao, Yang
Li, Shixiong
Li, Tao
Chen, Danjue
Chen, Yimin
contents Federated Learning (FL) is a popular paradigm enabling clients to jointly train a global model without sharing raw data. However, FL is known to be vulnerable towards backdoor attacks due to its distributed nature. As participants, attackers can upload model updates that effectively compromise FL. What's worse, existing defenses are mostly designed under independent-and-identically-distributed (iid) settings, hence neglecting the fundamental non-iid characteristic of FL. Here we propose FLBuff for tackling backdoor attacks even under non-iids. The main challenge for such defenses is that non-iids bring benign and malicious updates closer, hence harder to separate. FLBuff is inspired by our insight that non-iids can be modeled as omni-directional expansion in representation space while backdoor attacks as uni-directional. This leads to the key design of FLBuff, i.e., a supervised-contrastive-learning model extracting penultimate-layer representations to create a large in-between buffer layer. Comprehensive evaluations demonstrate that FLBuff consistently outperforms state-of-the-art defenses.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2503_23511
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Buffer is All You Need: Defending Federated Learning against Backdoor Attacks under Non-iids via Buffering
Lyu, Xingyu
Wang, Ning
Xiao, Yang
Li, Shixiong
Li, Tao
Chen, Danjue
Chen, Yimin
Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
Federated Learning (FL) is a popular paradigm enabling clients to jointly train a global model without sharing raw data. However, FL is known to be vulnerable towards backdoor attacks due to its distributed nature. As participants, attackers can upload model updates that effectively compromise FL. What's worse, existing defenses are mostly designed under independent-and-identically-distributed (iid) settings, hence neglecting the fundamental non-iid characteristic of FL. Here we propose FLBuff for tackling backdoor attacks even under non-iids. The main challenge for such defenses is that non-iids bring benign and malicious updates closer, hence harder to separate. FLBuff is inspired by our insight that non-iids can be modeled as omni-directional expansion in representation space while backdoor attacks as uni-directional. This leads to the key design of FLBuff, i.e., a supervised-contrastive-learning model extracting penultimate-layer representations to create a large in-between buffer layer. Comprehensive evaluations demonstrate that FLBuff consistently outperforms state-of-the-art defenses.
title Buffer is All You Need: Defending Federated Learning against Backdoor Attacks under Non-iids via Buffering
topic Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.23511