Revealed Bayesian Persuasion
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866914556016590848 |
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| author | Mensch, Jeffrey |
| author_facet | Mensch, Jeffrey |
| contents | How does one test empirically the hypothesis that a decision maker (DM) is being influenced by information via Bayesian persuasion? In this paper, I consider a DM whose state-dependent preferences are known to an analyst, who sees the conditional distribution of choices given the state. I provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the dataset to be consistent with the DM being Bayesian persuaded by an unobserved sender who generates a distribution of signals to ex-ante optimize the sender's expected payoff. I thereby provide a tool for empirical work on information design. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_01829 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Revealed Bayesian Persuasion Mensch, Jeffrey Theoretical Economics How does one test empirically the hypothesis that a decision maker (DM) is being influenced by information via Bayesian persuasion? In this paper, I consider a DM whose state-dependent preferences are known to an analyst, who sees the conditional distribution of choices given the state. I provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the dataset to be consistent with the DM being Bayesian persuaded by an unobserved sender who generates a distribution of signals to ex-ante optimize the sender's expected payoff. I thereby provide a tool for empirical work on information design. |
| title | Revealed Bayesian Persuasion |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.01829 |