Latency Advantages in Common-Value Auctions
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866914531903537152 |
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| author | Moallemi, Ciamac C. Pai, Mallesh M. Robinson, Dan |
| author_facet | Moallemi, Ciamac C. Pai, Mallesh M. Robinson, Dan |
| contents | In financial applications, latency advantages -- the ability to make decisions later than others, even without the ability to see what others have done -- can provide individual participants with an edge by allowing them to gather additional relevant information. For example, a trader who is able to act even milliseconds after another trader may receive information about changing prices on other exchanges that lets them make a profit at the expense of the latter. To better understand the economics of latency advantages, we consider a common-value auction with a reserve price in which some bidders may have more information about the value of the item than others, e.g., by bidding later. We provide a characterization of the equilibrium strategies, and study the welfare and auctioneer revenue implications of the last-mover advantage. We show that the auction does not degenerate completely and that the seller is still able to capture some value. We study comparative statics of the equilibrium under different assumptions about the nature of the latency advantage. Under the assumptions of the Black-Scholes model, we derive formulas for the last mover's expected profit, as well as for the sensitivity of that profit to their timing advantage. We apply our results to the design of blockchain protocols that aim to run auctions for financial assets on-chain, where incentives to increase timing advantages can put pressure on the decentralization of the system. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_02077 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Latency Advantages in Common-Value Auctions Moallemi, Ciamac C. Pai, Mallesh M. Robinson, Dan Theoretical Economics In financial applications, latency advantages -- the ability to make decisions later than others, even without the ability to see what others have done -- can provide individual participants with an edge by allowing them to gather additional relevant information. For example, a trader who is able to act even milliseconds after another trader may receive information about changing prices on other exchanges that lets them make a profit at the expense of the latter. To better understand the economics of latency advantages, we consider a common-value auction with a reserve price in which some bidders may have more information about the value of the item than others, e.g., by bidding later. We provide a characterization of the equilibrium strategies, and study the welfare and auctioneer revenue implications of the last-mover advantage. We show that the auction does not degenerate completely and that the seller is still able to capture some value. We study comparative statics of the equilibrium under different assumptions about the nature of the latency advantage. Under the assumptions of the Black-Scholes model, we derive formulas for the last mover's expected profit, as well as for the sensitivity of that profit to their timing advantage. We apply our results to the design of blockchain protocols that aim to run auctions for financial assets on-chain, where incentives to increase timing advantages can put pressure on the decentralization of the system. |
| title | Latency Advantages in Common-Value Auctions |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.02077 |