A Combinatorial Auction Design for Formulary Positions
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
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| _version_ | 1866910902509371392 |
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| author | Abrams, Lawrence W. |
| author_facet | Abrams, Lawrence W. |
| contents | The purpose of this paper is to apply the economics field of market design to develop a simple algebraic and graphic model of a combinatorial auction for formulary position assignments. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_02200 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Combinatorial Auction Design for Formulary Positions Abrams, Lawrence W. General Economics Economics The purpose of this paper is to apply the economics field of market design to develop a simple algebraic and graphic model of a combinatorial auction for formulary position assignments. |
| title | A Combinatorial Auction Design for Formulary Positions |
| topic | General Economics Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.02200 |