SLACK: Attacking LiDAR-based SLAM with Adversarial Point Injections

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Kumar, Prashant, Vattikonda, Dheeraj, Bhat, Kshitij Madhav, Dargan, Kunal, Kalra, Prem
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2025
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author Kumar, Prashant
Vattikonda, Dheeraj
Bhat, Kshitij Madhav
Dargan, Kunal
Kalra, Prem
author_facet Kumar, Prashant
Vattikonda, Dheeraj
Bhat, Kshitij Madhav
Dargan, Kunal
Kalra, Prem
contents The widespread adoption of learning-based methods for the LiDAR makes autonomous vehicles vulnerable to adversarial attacks through adversarial \textit{point injections (PiJ)}. It poses serious security challenges for navigation and map generation. Despite its critical nature, no major work exists that studies learning-based attacks on LiDAR-based SLAM. Our work proposes SLACK, an end-to-end deep generative adversarial model to attack LiDAR scans with several point injections without deteriorating LiDAR quality. To facilitate SLACK, we design a novel yet simple autoencoder that augments contrastive learning with segmentation-based attention for precise reconstructions. SLACK demonstrates superior performance on the task of \textit{point injections (PiJ)} compared to the best baselines on KITTI and CARLA-64 dataset while maintaining accurate scan quality. We qualitatively and quantitatively demonstrate PiJ attacks using a fraction of LiDAR points. It severely degrades navigation and map quality without deteriorating the LiDAR scan quality.
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id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_03089
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle SLACK: Attacking LiDAR-based SLAM with Adversarial Point Injections
Kumar, Prashant
Vattikonda, Dheeraj
Bhat, Kshitij Madhav
Dargan, Kunal
Kalra, Prem
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
The widespread adoption of learning-based methods for the LiDAR makes autonomous vehicles vulnerable to adversarial attacks through adversarial \textit{point injections (PiJ)}. It poses serious security challenges for navigation and map generation. Despite its critical nature, no major work exists that studies learning-based attacks on LiDAR-based SLAM. Our work proposes SLACK, an end-to-end deep generative adversarial model to attack LiDAR scans with several point injections without deteriorating LiDAR quality. To facilitate SLACK, we design a novel yet simple autoencoder that augments contrastive learning with segmentation-based attention for precise reconstructions. SLACK demonstrates superior performance on the task of \textit{point injections (PiJ)} compared to the best baselines on KITTI and CARLA-64 dataset while maintaining accurate scan quality. We qualitatively and quantitatively demonstrate PiJ attacks using a fraction of LiDAR points. It severely degrades navigation and map quality without deteriorating the LiDAR scan quality.
title SLACK: Attacking LiDAR-based SLAM with Adversarial Point Injections
topic Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.03089