Cover Image

Persuasive Calibration

Fuente: arXiv

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Feng, Yiding, Tang, Wei
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2025
Subjects:	Machine Learning Artificial Intelligence Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

Similar Items

Exploration and Persuasion
by: Slivkins, Aleksandrs
Published: (2024)

Algorithmic Persuasion Through Simulation
by: Harris, Keegan, et al.
Published: (2023)

Calibrated Forecasting and Persuasion
by: Jain, Atulya, et al.
Published: (2024)

Simple and Robust Quality Disclosure: The Power of Quantile Partition
by: Agrawal, Shipra, et al.
Published: (2026)

The Pseudo-Dimension of Contracts
by: Duetting, Paul, et al.
Published: (2025)

Fraud-Proof Revenue Division on Subscription Platforms
by: Ghosh, Abheek, et al.
Published: (2025)

Efficient Inverse Multiagent Learning
by: Goktas, Denizalp, et al.
Published: (2025)

Generalized Principal-Agent Problem with a Learning Agent
by: Lin, Tao, et al.
Published: (2024)

Are Bounded Contracts Learnable and Approximately Optimal?
by: Chen, Yurong, et al.
Published: (2024)

Contractual Reinforcement Learning: Pulling Arms with Invisible Hands
by: Wu, Jibang, et al.
Published: (2024)

Contracting with a Learning Agent
by: Guruganesh, Guru, et al.
Published: (2024)

No Screening is More Efficient with Multiple Objects
by: Noda, Shunya, et al.
Published: (2024)

Paid with Models: Optimal Contract Design for Collaborative Machine Learning
by: Wang, Bingchen, et al.
Published: (2024)

Human strategic decision making in parametrized games
by: Ganzfried, Sam
Published: (2021)

Calibeating Made Simple
by: Chen, Yurong, et al.
Published: (2026)

A New Lower Bound for the Random Offerer Mechanism in Bilateral Trade using AI-Guided Evolutionary Search
by: Cai, Yang, et al.
Published: (2026)

Data-Driven Persuasion
by: Rosenthal, Maxwell
Published: (2025)

Beyond Regularity: Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms, Revisited
by: Feng, Yiding, et al.
Published: (2024)

Persuasion Gains and Losses from Peer Communication
by: Kerman, Toygar T., et al.
Published: (2025)

Bayesian Persuasion with a Risk-Conscious Receiver
by: Chen, Yujing
Published: (2026)

Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules
by: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Published: (2023)

Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity
by: Beyhaghi, Hedyeh, et al.
Published: (2025)

Computing Equilibrium beyond Unilateral Deviation
by: Liu, Mingyang, et al.
Published: (2026)

Fairness in Repeated Matching: A Maximin Perspective
by: Lim, Eugene, et al.
Published: (2025)

Multi-agent Adaptive Mechanism Design
by: Han, Qiushi, et al.
Published: (2025)

Prediction-sharing During Training and Inference
by: Gafni, Yotam, et al.
Published: (2024)

Nash Convergence of Mean-Based Learning Algorithms in First-Price Auctions
by: Deng, Xiaotie, et al.
Published: (2021)

The Price of Proportional Representation in Temporal Voting
by: Teh, Nicholas
Published: (2026)

Computational Performance of Deep Reinforcement Learning to find Nash Equilibria
by: Graf, Christoph, et al.
Published: (2021)

Rational Adversaries and the Maintenance of Fragility: A Game-Theoretic Theory of Rational Stagnation
by: Hirota, Daisuke
Published: (2025)

Will AI Trade? A Computational Inversion of the No-Trade Theorem
by: Li, Hanyu, et al.
Published: (2025)

Tell Me Why: Incentivizing Explanations
by: Srinivasan, Siddarth, et al.
Published: (2025)

Understanding EFX Allocations: Counting and Variants
by: Neoh, Tzeh Yuan, et al.
Published: (2025)

Collective dynamics of strategic classification
by: Couto, Marta C., et al.
Published: (2025)

Human Misperception of Generative-AI Alignment: A Laboratory Experiment
by: He, Kevin, et al.
Published: (2025)

Misspecified Explore-then-Exploit Leads to Supra-Competitive Prices
by: Baek, Jackie, et al.
Published: (2026)

Human-AI Productivity Paradoxes: Modeling the Interplay of Skill, Effort, and AI Assistance
by: Aouad, Ali, et al.
Published: (2026)

A Revealed Preference Framework for AI Alignment
by: Suleymanov, Elchin
Published: (2026)

Learned Collusion
by: Compte, Olivier
Published: (2023)

Extrapolating Volition with Recursive Information Markets
by: Sudhir, Abhimanyu Pallavi, et al.
Published: (2026)