Verifiable affirmative action in school admissions
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866911711699664896 |
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| author | Hu, Xinquan Zhang, Jun |
| author_facet | Hu, Xinquan Zhang, Jun |
| contents | In many reserve-based affirmative action systems, admission cutoffs are publicly disclosed to enable students to verify whether reserved seats are correctly assigned. We introduce a verifiability criterion: each student must be able to confirm her assigned school and seat type using only her own score and the disclosed cutoffs, under two intuitive verification protocols. We show that a mechanism is individually rational, strategy-proof, and verifiable if and only if it is essentially a deferred acceptance mechanism using one of the two choice rules we characterize. We highlight one rule that assigns reserved seats only when a student cannot secure an open seat on merit. We apply our characterization to China's high school admissions and discuss its implications for affirmative action policies in Brazil and India. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_04689 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Verifiable affirmative action in school admissions Hu, Xinquan Zhang, Jun Theoretical Economics In many reserve-based affirmative action systems, admission cutoffs are publicly disclosed to enable students to verify whether reserved seats are correctly assigned. We introduce a verifiability criterion: each student must be able to confirm her assigned school and seat type using only her own score and the disclosed cutoffs, under two intuitive verification protocols. We show that a mechanism is individually rational, strategy-proof, and verifiable if and only if it is essentially a deferred acceptance mechanism using one of the two choice rules we characterize. We highlight one rule that assigns reserved seats only when a student cannot secure an open seat on merit. We apply our characterization to China's high school admissions and discuss its implications for affirmative action policies in Brazil and India. |
| title | Verifiable affirmative action in school admissions |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.04689 |