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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.05143 |
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| _version_ | 1866912313550831616 |
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| author | Evangelou, Nektarios Chotkan, Rowdy Nasrulin, Bulat Decouchant, Jérémie |
| author_facet | Evangelou, Nektarios Chotkan, Rowdy Nasrulin, Bulat Decouchant, Jérémie |
| contents | Blockchain solutions typically assume a synchronous network to ensure consistency and achieve consensus. In contrast, offline transaction systems aim to enable users to agree on and execute transactions without assuming bounded communication delays when interacting with the blockchain. Most existing offline payment schemes depend on trusted hardware wallets that are assumed to be secure and tamper-proof. While this work introduces Overdraft, a novel offline payment system that shifts the reliance from hardware to users themselves. Overdraft allows potential payment receivers to assess the likelihood of being paid, allowing them to accept transactions with confidence or deny them. Overdraft achieves this by maintaining a loan network that is weighted by online reputation. This loan network contains time-limited agreements where users pledge to cover another user's payment if necessary. For example, when a payer lacks sufficient funds at the moment of commitment. Offline users rely on the last known view of the loan network -- which they had access to when last online -- to determine whether to participate in an offline transaction. This view is used to estimate the probability of eventual payment, possibly using multiple loans. Once online again, users commit their transactions to the blockchain with any conflicts being resolved deterministically. Overdraft incorporates incentives for users and is designed to be resilient against Sybil attacks. As a proof of concept, we implemented Overdraft as an Ethereum Solidity smart contract and deployed it on the Sepolia testnet to evaluate its performance. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_05143 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Taming Double-Spending in Offline Payments with Reputation-Weighted Loan Networks Evangelou, Nektarios Chotkan, Rowdy Nasrulin, Bulat Decouchant, Jérémie Cryptography and Security Blockchain solutions typically assume a synchronous network to ensure consistency and achieve consensus. In contrast, offline transaction systems aim to enable users to agree on and execute transactions without assuming bounded communication delays when interacting with the blockchain. Most existing offline payment schemes depend on trusted hardware wallets that are assumed to be secure and tamper-proof. While this work introduces Overdraft, a novel offline payment system that shifts the reliance from hardware to users themselves. Overdraft allows potential payment receivers to assess the likelihood of being paid, allowing them to accept transactions with confidence or deny them. Overdraft achieves this by maintaining a loan network that is weighted by online reputation. This loan network contains time-limited agreements where users pledge to cover another user's payment if necessary. For example, when a payer lacks sufficient funds at the moment of commitment. Offline users rely on the last known view of the loan network -- which they had access to when last online -- to determine whether to participate in an offline transaction. This view is used to estimate the probability of eventual payment, possibly using multiple loans. Once online again, users commit their transactions to the blockchain with any conflicts being resolved deterministically. Overdraft incorporates incentives for users and is designed to be resilient against Sybil attacks. As a proof of concept, we implemented Overdraft as an Ethereum Solidity smart contract and deployed it on the Sepolia testnet to evaluate its performance. |
| title | Taming Double-Spending in Offline Payments with Reputation-Weighted Loan Networks |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.05143 |