StealthRank: LLM Ranking Manipulation via Stealthy Prompt Optimization

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Tang, Yiming, Fan, Yi, Yu, Chenxiao, Yang, Tiankai, Zhao, Yue, Hu, Xiyang
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
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author Tang, Yiming
Fan, Yi
Yu, Chenxiao
Yang, Tiankai
Zhao, Yue
Hu, Xiyang
author_facet Tang, Yiming
Fan, Yi
Yu, Chenxiao
Yang, Tiankai
Zhao, Yue
Hu, Xiyang
contents The integration of large language models (LLMs) into information retrieval systems introduces new attack surfaces, particularly for adversarial ranking manipulations. We present $\textbf{StealthRank}$, a novel adversarial attack method that manipulates LLM-driven ranking systems while maintaining textual fluency and stealth. Unlike existing methods that often introduce detectable anomalies, StealthRank employs an energy-based optimization framework combined with Langevin dynamics to generate StealthRank Prompts (SRPs)-adversarial text sequences embedded within item or document descriptions that subtly yet effectively influence LLM ranking mechanisms. We evaluate StealthRank across multiple LLMs, demonstrating its ability to covertly boost the ranking of target items while avoiding explicit manipulation traces. Our results show that StealthRank consistently outperforms state-of-the-art adversarial ranking baselines in both effectiveness and stealth, highlighting critical vulnerabilities in LLM-driven ranking systems. Our code is publicly available at $\href{https://github.com/Tangyiming205069/controllable-seo}{here}$.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_05804
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle StealthRank: LLM Ranking Manipulation via Stealthy Prompt Optimization
Tang, Yiming
Fan, Yi
Yu, Chenxiao
Yang, Tiankai
Zhao, Yue
Hu, Xiyang
Information Retrieval
Artificial Intelligence
Computation and Language
Machine Learning
The integration of large language models (LLMs) into information retrieval systems introduces new attack surfaces, particularly for adversarial ranking manipulations. We present $\textbf{StealthRank}$, a novel adversarial attack method that manipulates LLM-driven ranking systems while maintaining textual fluency and stealth. Unlike existing methods that often introduce detectable anomalies, StealthRank employs an energy-based optimization framework combined with Langevin dynamics to generate StealthRank Prompts (SRPs)-adversarial text sequences embedded within item or document descriptions that subtly yet effectively influence LLM ranking mechanisms. We evaluate StealthRank across multiple LLMs, demonstrating its ability to covertly boost the ranking of target items while avoiding explicit manipulation traces. Our results show that StealthRank consistently outperforms state-of-the-art adversarial ranking baselines in both effectiveness and stealth, highlighting critical vulnerabilities in LLM-driven ranking systems. Our code is publicly available at $\href{https://github.com/Tangyiming205069/controllable-seo}{here}$.
title StealthRank: LLM Ranking Manipulation via Stealthy Prompt Optimization
topic Information Retrieval
Artificial Intelligence
Computation and Language
Machine Learning
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.05804