Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Bilotta, Francesco, Binetti, Alberto, Manferdini, Giacomo
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
Subjects:
Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.06550
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1866912692367785984
author Bilotta, Francesco
Binetti, Alberto
Manferdini, Giacomo
author_facet Bilotta, Francesco
Binetti, Alberto
Manferdini, Giacomo
contents This paper studies the supply and effects of causal rhetoric in U.S. politics. We define causal rhetoric as assigning responsibility for political outcomes, via claims of blame and merit. Training a supervised classifier, we detect causal rhetoric in over a decade of congressional tweets, finding that its supply has risen rapidly and pervasively, displacing affective messaging. We show that the production of causal rhetoric involves a trade-off between revenues and costs. First, quasi-random variation in Twitter adoption shows that blame increases small-donor revenues by expanding donor count, while merit raises average donation size. Second, fine-grained legislative data suggest that policy ownership determines relative costs: blame is cheaper for opponents, merit for proposers. Finally, causal rhetoric has downstream effects on societal outcomes, fostering protest activity and shaping polarization and institutional trust.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_06550
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Blameocracy: Causal Rhetoric in Politics
Bilotta, Francesco
Binetti, Alberto
Manferdini, Giacomo
General Economics
Economics
This paper studies the supply and effects of causal rhetoric in U.S. politics. We define causal rhetoric as assigning responsibility for political outcomes, via claims of blame and merit. Training a supervised classifier, we detect causal rhetoric in over a decade of congressional tweets, finding that its supply has risen rapidly and pervasively, displacing affective messaging. We show that the production of causal rhetoric involves a trade-off between revenues and costs. First, quasi-random variation in Twitter adoption shows that blame increases small-donor revenues by expanding donor count, while merit raises average donation size. Second, fine-grained legislative data suggest that policy ownership determines relative costs: blame is cheaper for opponents, merit for proposers. Finally, causal rhetoric has downstream effects on societal outcomes, fostering protest activity and shaping polarization and institutional trust.
title Blameocracy: Causal Rhetoric in Politics
topic General Economics
Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.06550