Causal Inference under Interference through Designed Markets

Fuente: arXiv
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Autore principale: Munro, Evan
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
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author Munro, Evan
author_facet Munro, Evan
contents In auction and matching markets, estimating the welfare effects of demand-side treatments is challenging because of spillovers through the mechanism. We develop a quasi-experimental approach that avoids parametric assumptions typically imposed by structural methods. For a class of strategy-proof "cutoff" mechanisms, we propose an estimator that runs a weighted and perturbed version of the mechanism on data from a single market. The estimator is semi-parametrically efficient, asymptotically normal, and robust to a wide class of demand-side specifications. We propose spillover-aware targeting rules with vanishing asymptotic regret. Empirically, spillovers diminish the effect of information on inequality in Chilean schools.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_07217
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Causal Inference under Interference through Designed Markets
Munro, Evan
Econometrics
In auction and matching markets, estimating the welfare effects of demand-side treatments is challenging because of spillovers through the mechanism. We develop a quasi-experimental approach that avoids parametric assumptions typically imposed by structural methods. For a class of strategy-proof "cutoff" mechanisms, we propose an estimator that runs a weighted and perturbed version of the mechanism on data from a single market. The estimator is semi-parametrically efficient, asymptotically normal, and robust to a wide class of demand-side specifications. We propose spillover-aware targeting rules with vanishing asymptotic regret. Empirically, spillovers diminish the effect of information on inequality in Chilean schools.
title Causal Inference under Interference through Designed Markets
topic Econometrics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.07217