Strategic learning for disturbance rejection in multi-agent systems: Nash and Minmax in graphical games

Fuente: arXiv
Enregistré dans:
Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux: Wang, Xinyang, Guay, Martin, Wang, Shimin, Zhang, Hongwei
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2025
Sujets:
Accès en ligne:
Tags: Ajouter un tag
Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!
_version_ 1866909573779030016
author Wang, Xinyang
Guay, Martin
Wang, Shimin
Zhang, Hongwei
author_facet Wang, Xinyang
Guay, Martin
Wang, Shimin
Zhang, Hongwei
contents This article investigates the optimal control problem with disturbance rejection for discrete-time multi-agent systems under cooperative and non-cooperative graphical games frameworks. Given the practical challenges of obtaining accurate models, Q-function-based policy iteration methods are proposed to seek the Nash equilibrium solution for the cooperative graphical game and the distributed minmax solution for the non-cooperative graphical game. To implement these methods online, two reinforcement learning frameworks are developed, an actor-disturber-critic structure for the cooperative graphical game and an actor-adversary-disturber-critic structure for the non-cooperative graphical game. The stability of the proposed methods is rigorously analyzed, and simulation results are provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed methods.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_07547
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Strategic learning for disturbance rejection in multi-agent systems: Nash and Minmax in graphical games
Wang, Xinyang
Guay, Martin
Wang, Shimin
Zhang, Hongwei
Systems and Control
This article investigates the optimal control problem with disturbance rejection for discrete-time multi-agent systems under cooperative and non-cooperative graphical games frameworks. Given the practical challenges of obtaining accurate models, Q-function-based policy iteration methods are proposed to seek the Nash equilibrium solution for the cooperative graphical game and the distributed minmax solution for the non-cooperative graphical game. To implement these methods online, two reinforcement learning frameworks are developed, an actor-disturber-critic structure for the cooperative graphical game and an actor-adversary-disturber-critic structure for the non-cooperative graphical game. The stability of the proposed methods is rigorously analyzed, and simulation results are provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed methods.
title Strategic learning for disturbance rejection in multi-agent systems: Nash and Minmax in graphical games
topic Systems and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.07547