Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the Relationship between Agency, Autonomy, and Moral Patiency
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866910007991205888 |
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| author | Formosa, Paul Hipólito, Inês Montefiore, Thomas |
| author_facet | Formosa, Paul Hipólito, Inês Montefiore, Thomas |
| contents | The proliferation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems exhibiting complex and seemingly agentive behaviours necessitates a critical philosophical examination of their agency, autonomy, and moral status. In this paper we undertake a systematic analysis of the differences between basic, autonomous, and moral agency in artificial systems. We argue that while current AI systems are highly sophisticated, they lack genuine agency and autonomy because: they operate within rigid boundaries of pre-programmed objectives rather than exhibiting true goal-directed behaviour within their environment; they cannot authentically shape their engagement with the world; and they lack the critical self-reflection and autonomy competencies required for full autonomy. Nonetheless, we do not rule out the possibility of future systems that could achieve a limited form of artificial moral agency without consciousness through hybrid approaches to ethical decision-making. This leads us to suggest, by appealing to the necessity of consciousness for moral patiency, that such non-conscious AMAs might represent a case that challenges traditional assumptions about the necessary connection between moral agency and moral patiency. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_08853 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the Relationship between Agency, Autonomy, and Moral Patiency Formosa, Paul Hipólito, Inês Montefiore, Thomas Computers and Society Artificial Intelligence The proliferation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems exhibiting complex and seemingly agentive behaviours necessitates a critical philosophical examination of their agency, autonomy, and moral status. In this paper we undertake a systematic analysis of the differences between basic, autonomous, and moral agency in artificial systems. We argue that while current AI systems are highly sophisticated, they lack genuine agency and autonomy because: they operate within rigid boundaries of pre-programmed objectives rather than exhibiting true goal-directed behaviour within their environment; they cannot authentically shape their engagement with the world; and they lack the critical self-reflection and autonomy competencies required for full autonomy. Nonetheless, we do not rule out the possibility of future systems that could achieve a limited form of artificial moral agency without consciousness through hybrid approaches to ethical decision-making. This leads us to suggest, by appealing to the necessity of consciousness for moral patiency, that such non-conscious AMAs might represent a case that challenges traditional assumptions about the necessary connection between moral agency and moral patiency. |
| title | Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the Relationship between Agency, Autonomy, and Moral Patiency |
| topic | Computers and Society Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.08853 |