Enhancing Decentralization in Blockchain Decision-Making Through Quadratic Voting and Its Generalization
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866910913461747712 |
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| author | Kovalchuk, Lyudmila Rodinko, Mariia Oliynykov, Roman Nastenko, Andrii Kaidalov, Dmytro Nelson, Kenric |
| author_facet | Kovalchuk, Lyudmila Rodinko, Mariia Oliynykov, Roman Nastenko, Andrii Kaidalov, Dmytro Nelson, Kenric |
| contents | This study explores the application of Quadratic Voting (QV) and its generalization to improve decentralization and effectiveness in blockchain governance systems. The conducted research identified three main types of quadratic (square root) voting. Two of them pertain to voting with a split stake, and one involves voting without splitting. In split stakes, Type 1 QV applies the square root to the total stake before distributing it among preferences, while Type 2 QV distributes the stake first and then applies the square root. In unsplit stakes (Type 3 QV), the square root of the total stake is allocated entirely to each preference. The presented formal proofs confirm that Types 2 and 3 QV, along with generalized models, enhance decentralization as measured by the Gini and Nakamoto coefficients. A pivotal discovery is the existence of a threshold stakeholder whose relative voting ratio increases under QV compared to linear voting, while smaller stakeholders also gain influence. The generalized QV model allows flexible adjustment of this threshold, enabling tailored decentralization levels. Maintaining fairness, QV ensures that stakeholders with higher stakes retain a proportionally greater voting ratio while redistributing influence to prevent excessive concentration. It is shown that to preserve fairness and robustness, QV must be implemented alongside privacy-preserving cryptographic voting protocols, as voters casting their ballots last could otherwise manipulate outcomes. The generalized QV model, proposed in this paper, enables algorithmic parametrization to achieve desired levels of decentralization for specific use cases. This flexibility makes it applicable across diverse domains, including user interaction with cryptocurrency platforms, facilitating community events and educational initiatives, and supporting charitable activities through decentralized decision-making. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_12859 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Enhancing Decentralization in Blockchain Decision-Making Through Quadratic Voting and Its Generalization Kovalchuk, Lyudmila Rodinko, Mariia Oliynykov, Roman Nastenko, Andrii Kaidalov, Dmytro Nelson, Kenric Computer Science and Game Theory This study explores the application of Quadratic Voting (QV) and its generalization to improve decentralization and effectiveness in blockchain governance systems. The conducted research identified three main types of quadratic (square root) voting. Two of them pertain to voting with a split stake, and one involves voting without splitting. In split stakes, Type 1 QV applies the square root to the total stake before distributing it among preferences, while Type 2 QV distributes the stake first and then applies the square root. In unsplit stakes (Type 3 QV), the square root of the total stake is allocated entirely to each preference. The presented formal proofs confirm that Types 2 and 3 QV, along with generalized models, enhance decentralization as measured by the Gini and Nakamoto coefficients. A pivotal discovery is the existence of a threshold stakeholder whose relative voting ratio increases under QV compared to linear voting, while smaller stakeholders also gain influence. The generalized QV model allows flexible adjustment of this threshold, enabling tailored decentralization levels. Maintaining fairness, QV ensures that stakeholders with higher stakes retain a proportionally greater voting ratio while redistributing influence to prevent excessive concentration. It is shown that to preserve fairness and robustness, QV must be implemented alongside privacy-preserving cryptographic voting protocols, as voters casting their ballots last could otherwise manipulate outcomes. The generalized QV model, proposed in this paper, enables algorithmic parametrization to achieve desired levels of decentralization for specific use cases. This flexibility makes it applicable across diverse domains, including user interaction with cryptocurrency platforms, facilitating community events and educational initiatives, and supporting charitable activities through decentralized decision-making. |
| title | Enhancing Decentralization in Blockchain Decision-Making Through Quadratic Voting and Its Generalization |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.12859 |