CEE: An Inference-Time Jailbreak Defense for Embodied Intelligence via Subspace Concept Rotation

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Yang, Jirui, Lin, Zheyu, Lu, Zhihui, Wang, Yinggui, Wang, Lei, Wei, Tao, Duan, Qiang, Du, Xin, Yang, Shuhan
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2025
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author Yang, Jirui
Lin, Zheyu
Lu, Zhihui
Wang, Yinggui
Wang, Lei
Wei, Tao
Duan, Qiang
Du, Xin
Yang, Shuhan
author_facet Yang, Jirui
Lin, Zheyu
Lu, Zhihui
Wang, Yinggui
Wang, Lei
Wei, Tao
Duan, Qiang
Du, Xin
Yang, Shuhan
contents Large language models (LLMs) are widely used for task understanding and action planning in embodied intelligence (EI) systems, but their adoption substantially increases vulnerability to jailbreak attacks. While recent work explores inference-time defenses, existing methods rely on static interventions on intermediate representations, which often degrade generation quality and impair adherence to task instructions, reducing system usability in EI settings. We propose a dynamic defense framework. For each EI inference request, we dynamically construct a task-specific safety-semantic subspace, project its hidden state to the most relevant direction, and apply SLERP rotation for adaptive safety control. At comparable defense success rates, our method preserves generation quality, improves usability, reduces tuning cost, and strengthens robustness in EI scenarios.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_13201
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle CEE: An Inference-Time Jailbreak Defense for Embodied Intelligence via Subspace Concept Rotation
Yang, Jirui
Lin, Zheyu
Lu, Zhihui
Wang, Yinggui
Wang, Lei
Wei, Tao
Duan, Qiang
Du, Xin
Yang, Shuhan
Cryptography and Security
Machine Learning
Multiagent Systems
Large language models (LLMs) are widely used for task understanding and action planning in embodied intelligence (EI) systems, but their adoption substantially increases vulnerability to jailbreak attacks. While recent work explores inference-time defenses, existing methods rely on static interventions on intermediate representations, which often degrade generation quality and impair adherence to task instructions, reducing system usability in EI settings. We propose a dynamic defense framework. For each EI inference request, we dynamically construct a task-specific safety-semantic subspace, project its hidden state to the most relevant direction, and apply SLERP rotation for adaptive safety control. At comparable defense success rates, our method preserves generation quality, improves usability, reduces tuning cost, and strengthens robustness in EI scenarios.
title CEE: An Inference-Time Jailbreak Defense for Embodied Intelligence via Subspace Concept Rotation
topic Cryptography and Security
Machine Learning
Multiagent Systems
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.13201