The River Method
Fuente:
arXiv
Salvato in:
| Autori principali: | , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | |
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| _version_ | 1866916698453442560 |
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| author | Döring, Michelle Brill, Markus Heitzig, Jobst |
| author_facet | Döring, Michelle Brill, Markus Heitzig, Jobst |
| contents | We introduce River, a novel Condorcet-consistent voting method that is based on pairwise majority margins and can be seen as a simplified variation of Tideman's Ranked Pairs method. River is simple to explain, simple to compute even 'by hand', and gives rise to an easy-to-interpret certificate in the form of a directed tree. Like Ranked Pairs and Schulze's Beat Path method, River is a refinement of the Split Cycle method and shares with those many desirable properties, including independence of clones. Unlike the other three methods, River satisfies a strong form of resistance to agenda-manipulation that is known as independence of Pareto-dominated alternatives. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_14195 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The River Method Döring, Michelle Brill, Markus Heitzig, Jobst Computer Science and Game Theory We introduce River, a novel Condorcet-consistent voting method that is based on pairwise majority margins and can be seen as a simplified variation of Tideman's Ranked Pairs method. River is simple to explain, simple to compute even 'by hand', and gives rise to an easy-to-interpret certificate in the form of a directed tree. Like Ranked Pairs and Schulze's Beat Path method, River is a refinement of the Split Cycle method and shares with those many desirable properties, including independence of clones. Unlike the other three methods, River satisfies a strong form of resistance to agenda-manipulation that is known as independence of Pareto-dominated alternatives. |
| title | The River Method |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.14195 |