Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Liu, Linkun, Sun, Jian, Tian, Ye
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2025
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.14539
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
_version_ 1866914292414021632
author Liu, Linkun
Sun, Jian
Tian, Ye
author_facet Liu, Linkun
Sun, Jian
Tian, Ye
contents The application of external human-machine interface (EHMI) on autonomous vehicles (AVs) facilitates information exchange. Existing research fails to consider the impact of the sequence of actions, as well as the effects of EHMI applications and deception, raising the question of whether benevolent, well-intentioned deception should be permitted (i.e., misleading statements that are intended to benefit both parties). We established a game theory based EHMI information disclosure framework for AVs in this study. In considering benevolent deception, this framework divided the decision-making process into three stages, respectively encompassing three key questions: whether to disclose, when to disclose, and what type of intention information to disclose. The results show that theoretical advantages of deception exist in certain cases when AV expects to maximize the safety of the interaction. In 40 out of 484 cases (8.3%), safety can be enhanced through successful deception. Those successful deceptions fall into two categories: 1) In 28 of these cases, the straight-going AV expected the left-turning human-driven vehicle (HV) to yield, while HV exhibited lower speed and higher acceleration; 2) In 12 of these cases, AV expected HV to proceed first, while HV exhibited higher speed and lower acceleration. We also conducted a VR-based driving simulation experiment, and the results confirmed our conclusion. Additionally, we found that when participants had low trust in the EHMI, its use negatively impacted interaction efficiency instead. This study serves as an exploratory behavioral mechanism study based on specific hypotheses for future EHMI design and ethical decision-making of autonomous driving system.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_14539
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Should Benevolent Deception be Allowed in EHMI? A Mechanism Explanation Based on Game Theory
Liu, Linkun
Sun, Jian
Tian, Ye
Human-Computer Interaction
The application of external human-machine interface (EHMI) on autonomous vehicles (AVs) facilitates information exchange. Existing research fails to consider the impact of the sequence of actions, as well as the effects of EHMI applications and deception, raising the question of whether benevolent, well-intentioned deception should be permitted (i.e., misleading statements that are intended to benefit both parties). We established a game theory based EHMI information disclosure framework for AVs in this study. In considering benevolent deception, this framework divided the decision-making process into three stages, respectively encompassing three key questions: whether to disclose, when to disclose, and what type of intention information to disclose. The results show that theoretical advantages of deception exist in certain cases when AV expects to maximize the safety of the interaction. In 40 out of 484 cases (8.3%), safety can be enhanced through successful deception. Those successful deceptions fall into two categories: 1) In 28 of these cases, the straight-going AV expected the left-turning human-driven vehicle (HV) to yield, while HV exhibited lower speed and higher acceleration; 2) In 12 of these cases, AV expected HV to proceed first, while HV exhibited higher speed and lower acceleration. We also conducted a VR-based driving simulation experiment, and the results confirmed our conclusion. Additionally, we found that when participants had low trust in the EHMI, its use negatively impacted interaction efficiency instead. This study serves as an exploratory behavioral mechanism study based on specific hypotheses for future EHMI design and ethical decision-making of autonomous driving system.
title Should Benevolent Deception be Allowed in EHMI? A Mechanism Explanation Based on Game Theory
topic Human-Computer Interaction
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.14539