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Main Authors: Gordienko, Polina, Jansen, Christoph, Augustin, Thomas, Rechenauer, Martin
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
Subjects:
Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.14624
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author Gordienko, Polina
Jansen, Christoph
Augustin, Thomas
Rechenauer, Martin
author_facet Gordienko, Polina
Jansen, Christoph
Augustin, Thomas
Rechenauer, Martin
contents We propose a framework for probability aggregation based on propositional probability logic. Unlike conventional judgment aggregation, which focuses on static rationality, our model addresses dynamic rationality by ensuring that collective beliefs update consistently with new information. We show that any consensus-compatible and independent aggregation rule on a non-nested agenda is necessarily linear. Furthermore, we provide sufficient conditions for a fair learning process, where individuals initially agree on a specified subset of propositions known as the common ground, and new information is restricted to this shared foundation. This guarantees that updating individual judgments via Bayesian conditioning-whether performed before or after aggregation-yields the same collective belief. A distinctive feature of our framework is its treatment of sequential decision-making, which allows new information to be incorporated progressively through multiple stages while maintaining the established common ground. We illustrate our findings with a running example in a political scenario concerning healthcare and immigration policies.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_14624
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Consensus in Motion: A Case of Dynamic Rationality of Sequential Learning in Probability Aggregation
Gordienko, Polina
Jansen, Christoph
Augustin, Thomas
Rechenauer, Martin
Artificial Intelligence
We propose a framework for probability aggregation based on propositional probability logic. Unlike conventional judgment aggregation, which focuses on static rationality, our model addresses dynamic rationality by ensuring that collective beliefs update consistently with new information. We show that any consensus-compatible and independent aggregation rule on a non-nested agenda is necessarily linear. Furthermore, we provide sufficient conditions for a fair learning process, where individuals initially agree on a specified subset of propositions known as the common ground, and new information is restricted to this shared foundation. This guarantees that updating individual judgments via Bayesian conditioning-whether performed before or after aggregation-yields the same collective belief. A distinctive feature of our framework is its treatment of sequential decision-making, which allows new information to be incorporated progressively through multiple stages while maintaining the established common ground. We illustrate our findings with a running example in a political scenario concerning healthcare and immigration policies.
title Consensus in Motion: A Case of Dynamic Rationality of Sequential Learning in Probability Aggregation
topic Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.14624