An Enhanced Dual-Currency VCG Auction Mechanism for Resource Allocation in IoV: A Value of Information Perspective
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866916699210514432 |
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| author | Wang, Wei Cheng, Nan Zhou, Conghao Peng, Haixia Zhou, Haibo Su, Zhou Xuemin Shen |
| author_facet | Wang, Wei Cheng, Nan Zhou, Conghao Peng, Haixia Zhou, Haibo Su, Zhou Xuemin Shen |
| contents | The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) is undergoing a transformative evolution, enabled by advancements in future 6G network technologies, to support intelligent, highly reliable, and low-latency vehicular services. However, the enhanced capabilities of loV have heightened the demands for efficient network resource allocation while simultaneously giving rise to diverse vehicular service requirements. For network service providers (NSPs), meeting the customized resource-slicing requirements of vehicle service providers (VSPs) while maximizing social welfare has become a significant challenge. This paper proposes an innovative solution by integrating a mean-field multi-agent reinforcement learning (MFMARL) framework with an enhanced Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction mechanism to address the problem of social welfare maximization under the condition of unknown VSP utility functions. The core of this solution is introducing the ``value of information" as a novel monetary metric to estimate the expected benefits of VSPs, thereby ensuring the effective execution of the VCG auction mechanism. MFMARL is employed to optimize resource allocation for social welfare maximization while adapting to the intelligent and dynamic requirements of IoV. The proposed enhanced VCG auction mechanism not only protects the privacy of VSPs but also reduces the likelihood of collusion among VSPs, and it is theoretically proven to be dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC). The simulation results demonstrate that, compared to the VCG mechanism implemented using quantization methods, the proposed mechanism exhibits significant advantages in convergence speed, social welfare maximization, and resistance to collusion, providing new insights into resource allocation in intelligent 6G networks. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_14824 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | An Enhanced Dual-Currency VCG Auction Mechanism for Resource Allocation in IoV: A Value of Information Perspective Wang, Wei Cheng, Nan Zhou, Conghao Peng, Haixia Zhou, Haibo Su, Zhou Xuemin Shen Computer Science and Game Theory The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) is undergoing a transformative evolution, enabled by advancements in future 6G network technologies, to support intelligent, highly reliable, and low-latency vehicular services. However, the enhanced capabilities of loV have heightened the demands for efficient network resource allocation while simultaneously giving rise to diverse vehicular service requirements. For network service providers (NSPs), meeting the customized resource-slicing requirements of vehicle service providers (VSPs) while maximizing social welfare has become a significant challenge. This paper proposes an innovative solution by integrating a mean-field multi-agent reinforcement learning (MFMARL) framework with an enhanced Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction mechanism to address the problem of social welfare maximization under the condition of unknown VSP utility functions. The core of this solution is introducing the ``value of information" as a novel monetary metric to estimate the expected benefits of VSPs, thereby ensuring the effective execution of the VCG auction mechanism. MFMARL is employed to optimize resource allocation for social welfare maximization while adapting to the intelligent and dynamic requirements of IoV. The proposed enhanced VCG auction mechanism not only protects the privacy of VSPs but also reduces the likelihood of collusion among VSPs, and it is theoretically proven to be dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC). The simulation results demonstrate that, compared to the VCG mechanism implemented using quantization methods, the proposed mechanism exhibits significant advantages in convergence speed, social welfare maximization, and resistance to collusion, providing new insights into resource allocation in intelligent 6G networks. |
| title | An Enhanced Dual-Currency VCG Auction Mechanism for Resource Allocation in IoV: A Value of Information Perspective |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.14824 |