Trusted Compute Units: A Framework for Chained Verifiable Computations

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Castillo, Fernando, Heiss, Jonathan, Werner, Sebastian, Tai, Stefan
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Castillo, Fernando
Heiss, Jonathan
Werner, Sebastian
Tai, Stefan
author_facet Castillo, Fernando
Heiss, Jonathan
Werner, Sebastian
Tai, Stefan
contents Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) facilitate decentralized computations across trust boundaries. However, ensuring complex computations with low gas fees and confidentiality remains challenging. Recent advances in Confidential Computing -- leveraging hardware-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) -- and Proof-carrying Data -- employing cryptographic Zero-Knowledge Virtual Machines (zkVMs) -- hold promise for secure, privacy-preserving off-chain and layer-2 computations. On the other side, a homogeneous reliance on a single technology, such as TEEs or zkVMs, is impractical for decentralized environments with heterogeneous computational requirements. This paper introduces the Trusted Compute Unit (TCU), a unifying framework that enables composable and interoperable verifiable computations across heterogeneous technologies. Our approach allows decentralized applications (dApps) to flexibly offload complex computations to TCUs, obtaining proof of correctness. These proofs can be anchored on-chain for automated dApp interactions, while ensuring confidentiality of input data, and integrity of output data. We demonstrate how TCUs can support a prominent blockchain use case, such as federated learning. By enabling secure off-chain interactions without incurring on-chain confirmation delays or gas fees, TCUs significantly improve system performance and scalability. Experimental insights and performance evaluations confirm the feasibility and practicality of this unified approach, advancing the state of the art in verifiable off-chain services for the blockchain ecosystem.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_15717
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Trusted Compute Units: A Framework for Chained Verifiable Computations
Castillo, Fernando
Heiss, Jonathan
Werner, Sebastian
Tai, Stefan
Cryptography and Security
Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) facilitate decentralized computations across trust boundaries. However, ensuring complex computations with low gas fees and confidentiality remains challenging. Recent advances in Confidential Computing -- leveraging hardware-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) -- and Proof-carrying Data -- employing cryptographic Zero-Knowledge Virtual Machines (zkVMs) -- hold promise for secure, privacy-preserving off-chain and layer-2 computations. On the other side, a homogeneous reliance on a single technology, such as TEEs or zkVMs, is impractical for decentralized environments with heterogeneous computational requirements. This paper introduces the Trusted Compute Unit (TCU), a unifying framework that enables composable and interoperable verifiable computations across heterogeneous technologies. Our approach allows decentralized applications (dApps) to flexibly offload complex computations to TCUs, obtaining proof of correctness. These proofs can be anchored on-chain for automated dApp interactions, while ensuring confidentiality of input data, and integrity of output data. We demonstrate how TCUs can support a prominent blockchain use case, such as federated learning. By enabling secure off-chain interactions without incurring on-chain confirmation delays or gas fees, TCUs significantly improve system performance and scalability. Experimental insights and performance evaluations confirm the feasibility and practicality of this unified approach, advancing the state of the art in verifiable off-chain services for the blockchain ecosystem.
title Trusted Compute Units: A Framework for Chained Verifiable Computations
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.15717