Quantitative Strategy Templates

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Anand, Ashwani, Nayak, Satya Prakash, Raha, Ritam, Sağlam, Irmak, Schmuck, Anne-Kathrin
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2025
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author Anand, Ashwani
Nayak, Satya Prakash
Raha, Ritam
Sağlam, Irmak
Schmuck, Anne-Kathrin
author_facet Anand, Ashwani
Nayak, Satya Prakash
Raha, Ritam
Sağlam, Irmak
Schmuck, Anne-Kathrin
contents This paper presents (permissive) \emph{Quantitative Strategy Templates} (QaSTels) to succinctly represent infinitely many winning strategies in two-player energy and mean-payoff games. This transfers the recently introduced concept of \emph{Permissive (qualitative) Strategy Templates} (PeSTels) for $ω$-regular games to games with quantitative objectives. We provide the theoretical and algorithmic foundations of (i) QaSTel synthesis, and (ii) their (incremental) combination with PeSTels for games with mixed quantitative and qualitative objectives. Using a prototype implementation of our synthesis algorithms, we demonstrate empirically that QaSTels extend the advantageous properties of strategy templates over single winning strategies -- known from PeSTels -- to games with (additional) quantitative objectives. This includes (i) the enhanced robustness of strategies due to their runtime-adaptability, and (ii) the compositionality of templates w.r.t. incrementally arriving objectives. We use control-inspired examples to illustrate these superior properties of QaSTels for CPS design.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_16528
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Quantitative Strategy Templates
Anand, Ashwani
Nayak, Satya Prakash
Raha, Ritam
Sağlam, Irmak
Schmuck, Anne-Kathrin
Computer Science and Game Theory
This paper presents (permissive) \emph{Quantitative Strategy Templates} (QaSTels) to succinctly represent infinitely many winning strategies in two-player energy and mean-payoff games. This transfers the recently introduced concept of \emph{Permissive (qualitative) Strategy Templates} (PeSTels) for $ω$-regular games to games with quantitative objectives. We provide the theoretical and algorithmic foundations of (i) QaSTel synthesis, and (ii) their (incremental) combination with PeSTels for games with mixed quantitative and qualitative objectives. Using a prototype implementation of our synthesis algorithms, we demonstrate empirically that QaSTels extend the advantageous properties of strategy templates over single winning strategies -- known from PeSTels -- to games with (additional) quantitative objectives. This includes (i) the enhanced robustness of strategies due to their runtime-adaptability, and (ii) the compositionality of templates w.r.t. incrementally arriving objectives. We use control-inspired examples to illustrate these superior properties of QaSTels for CPS design.
title Quantitative Strategy Templates
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.16528