Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection: The Case of Generic Extensive Form Games
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866908334663139328 |
|---|---|
| author | Govindan, Srihari Wilson, Robert B. |
| author_facet | Govindan, Srihari Wilson, Robert B. |
| contents | A solution concept that is a refinement of Nash equilibria selects for each finite game a nonempty collection of closed and connected subsets of Nash equilibria as solutions. We impose three axioms for such solution concepts. The axiom of backward induction requires each solution to contain a quasi-perfect equilibrium. Two invariance axioms posit that solutions of a game are the same as those of a game obtained by the addition of strategically irrelevant strategies and players. Stability satisfies these axioms; and any solution concept that satisfies them must, for generic extensive-form games, select from among its stable outcomes. A strengthening of the two invariance axioms provides an analogous axiomatization of components of equilibria with a nonzero index. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_16908 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection: The Case of Generic Extensive Form Games Govindan, Srihari Wilson, Robert B. Theoretical Economics A solution concept that is a refinement of Nash equilibria selects for each finite game a nonempty collection of closed and connected subsets of Nash equilibria as solutions. We impose three axioms for such solution concepts. The axiom of backward induction requires each solution to contain a quasi-perfect equilibrium. Two invariance axioms posit that solutions of a game are the same as those of a game obtained by the addition of strategically irrelevant strategies and players. Stability satisfies these axioms; and any solution concept that satisfies them must, for generic extensive-form games, select from among its stable outcomes. A strengthening of the two invariance axioms provides an analogous axiomatization of components of equilibria with a nonzero index. |
| title | Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection: The Case of Generic Extensive Form Games |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.16908 |