Path Integral Methods for Synthesizing and Preventing Stealthy Attacks in Nonlinear Cyber-Physical Systems
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866915256285003776 |
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| author | Patil, Apurva Morgenstein, Kyle Sentis, Luis Tanaka, Takashi |
| author_facet | Patil, Apurva Morgenstein, Kyle Sentis, Luis Tanaka, Takashi |
| contents | This paper studies the synthesis and mitigation of stealthy attacks in nonlinear cyber-physical systems (CPS). To quantify stealthiness, we employ the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, a measure rooted in hypothesis testing and detection theory, which captures the trade-off between an attacker's desire to remain stealthy and her goal of degrading system performance. First, we synthesize the worst-case stealthy attack in nonlinear CPS using the path integral approach. Second, we consider how a controller can mitigate the impact of such stealthy attacks by formulating a minimax KL control problem, yielding a zero-sum game between the attacker and the controller. Again, we leverage a path integral-based solution that computes saddle-point policies for both players through Monte Carlo simulations. We validate our approach using unicycle navigation and cruise control problems, demonstrating how an attacker can covertly drive the system into unsafe regions, and how the controller can adapt her policy to combat the worst-case attacks. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_17118 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Path Integral Methods for Synthesizing and Preventing Stealthy Attacks in Nonlinear Cyber-Physical Systems Patil, Apurva Morgenstein, Kyle Sentis, Luis Tanaka, Takashi Systems and Control Information Theory This paper studies the synthesis and mitigation of stealthy attacks in nonlinear cyber-physical systems (CPS). To quantify stealthiness, we employ the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, a measure rooted in hypothesis testing and detection theory, which captures the trade-off between an attacker's desire to remain stealthy and her goal of degrading system performance. First, we synthesize the worst-case stealthy attack in nonlinear CPS using the path integral approach. Second, we consider how a controller can mitigate the impact of such stealthy attacks by formulating a minimax KL control problem, yielding a zero-sum game between the attacker and the controller. Again, we leverage a path integral-based solution that computes saddle-point policies for both players through Monte Carlo simulations. We validate our approach using unicycle navigation and cruise control problems, demonstrating how an attacker can covertly drive the system into unsafe regions, and how the controller can adapt her policy to combat the worst-case attacks. |
| title | Path Integral Methods for Synthesizing and Preventing Stealthy Attacks in Nonlinear Cyber-Physical Systems |
| topic | Systems and Control Information Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.17118 |