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Main Author: Aoi, Elizabeth Nanami
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
Subjects:
Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.17467
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author Aoi, Elizabeth Nanami
author_facet Aoi, Elizabeth Nanami
contents In two-sided matching market, when the regional constraints are present, the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm suffers from undesirable inefficiency due to the artificial allocation of the regional caps among hospitals. We show that, given preferences, there exist allocations that guarantee the efficiency of the DA algorithm. Furthermore, it is equivalent to the FDA algorithm developed by Kamada and Kojima (2015), which endows the latter with an interpretation as a tool for endogenous capacity design. Our proof applies the optimality within the matching with contracts (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005) framework, offering a broadly applicable method for establishing equivalence among DA-based mechanisms.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_17467
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Matching with regional constraints: An equivalence
Aoi, Elizabeth Nanami
Theoretical Economics
In two-sided matching market, when the regional constraints are present, the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm suffers from undesirable inefficiency due to the artificial allocation of the regional caps among hospitals. We show that, given preferences, there exist allocations that guarantee the efficiency of the DA algorithm. Furthermore, it is equivalent to the FDA algorithm developed by Kamada and Kojima (2015), which endows the latter with an interpretation as a tool for endogenous capacity design. Our proof applies the optimality within the matching with contracts (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005) framework, offering a broadly applicable method for establishing equivalence among DA-based mechanisms.
title Matching with regional constraints: An equivalence
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.17467