A Composable Game-Theoretic Framework for Blockchains
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866914452430913536 |
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| author | Avarikioti, Zeta Fuchsbauer, Georg Keer, Pim Maffei, Matteo Regen, Fabian |
| author_facet | Avarikioti, Zeta Fuchsbauer, Georg Keer, Pim Maffei, Matteo Regen, Fabian |
| contents | Blockchains rely on economic incentives to ensure secure and decentralised operation, making incentive compatibility a core design concern. However, protocols are rarely deployed in isolation. Applications interact with the underlying consensus and network layers, and multiple protocols may run concurrently on the same chain. These interactions give rise to complex incentive dynamics that traditional, isolated analyses often fail to capture.
We propose the first compositional game-theoretic framework for blockchain protocols. Our model represents blockchain protocols as interacting games across the application, network, and consensus layers. It enables formal reasoning about incentive compatibility under composition by introducing two key abstractions: the cross-layer game, which models how strategies in one layer influence others, and cross-application composition, which captures how application protocols interact concurrently through shared infrastructure.
We illustrate our framework through case studies on Hashed Timelock Contracts (HTLCs), Layer-2 protocols, and Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) showing how compositional analysis reveals new subtle incentive vulnerabilities and supports modular security proofs. Also, by introduction of a novel rational miner model, we derive new conditions for the robustness of timelocks to bribing attacks. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2504_18214 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Composable Game-Theoretic Framework for Blockchains Avarikioti, Zeta Fuchsbauer, Georg Keer, Pim Maffei, Matteo Regen, Fabian Computer Science and Game Theory Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science Blockchains rely on economic incentives to ensure secure and decentralised operation, making incentive compatibility a core design concern. However, protocols are rarely deployed in isolation. Applications interact with the underlying consensus and network layers, and multiple protocols may run concurrently on the same chain. These interactions give rise to complex incentive dynamics that traditional, isolated analyses often fail to capture. We propose the first compositional game-theoretic framework for blockchain protocols. Our model represents blockchain protocols as interacting games across the application, network, and consensus layers. It enables formal reasoning about incentive compatibility under composition by introducing two key abstractions: the cross-layer game, which models how strategies in one layer influence others, and cross-application composition, which captures how application protocols interact concurrently through shared infrastructure. We illustrate our framework through case studies on Hashed Timelock Contracts (HTLCs), Layer-2 protocols, and Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) showing how compositional analysis reveals new subtle incentive vulnerabilities and supports modular security proofs. Also, by introduction of a novel rational miner model, we derive new conditions for the robustness of timelocks to bribing attacks. |
| title | A Composable Game-Theoretic Framework for Blockchains |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.18214 |